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TRAINING FOR TERROR: A CASE STUDY OF AL-QAIDA

by

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March 2002

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TRAINING FOR TERROR: A CASE STUDY OF AL-QAIDA

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

A recently acquired translated copy of an Al-Qaida training manual is analyzed utilizing the Four Frameworks Model, which states that organizations can be better understood if they are studied from structural, human resources, symbolic, and political perspectives. An overview of Middle Eastern terrorism, a synopsis of the Al-Qaida organization, a review of the contents of the training manual, and an Al-Qaida policy review are also delineated. Of the many conclusions presented, the first states that the Al-Qaida training manual and its precepts are indeed being used to guide terrorist operations. Al-Qaida believe their cause is just based on religious decrees, and that the use of training manuals helps to portray the group in a favorable light, reinforces ideology, and builds support. Al-Qaida have a strong need to rationalize and justify what they do. The success of the World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings may have given Al-Qaida a spiritual boost and hardened their resolve to continue their mission, despite the U.S. War on Terrorism. Recommendations and areas of further research are presented to enhance the intelligence community's understanding of the internal workings of the group.

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I. INTRODUCTION

*“Life seems to be characterized by long stretches of boredom
punctuated by periods of intense terror.”*

Stephen Jay Gould (Bryson, 1995, p.3)

A. PREFACE

On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four U.S. commercial airplanes and attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist group, Al-Qaida, claimed responsibility. The question on everyone’s mind is, “Why did September 11th occur?” This paper hopes to answer this question by utilizing a translation of an Al-Qaida training manual recently appropriated during a trial of an Al-Qaida terrorist.¹ This text was recently translated into English and is a primary source document explicitly stating the Al-Qaida mission, objectives, personnel characteristics for newly recruited Al-Qaida members, training requirements, and specific information on how to conduct different types of terrorist operations. Among the training specifics, primary and secondary target types are delineated. These targets include areas of significant economic and symbolic importance, i.e., the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. As such, this document is critical to the understanding of the Al-Qaida *modus operandi* and may give insights into future terrorist targets.

In his testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, Bruce Hoffman indicated that September 11, 2001 did not occur due to an intelligence failure, but rather the absence of a clearly defined national strategy for counter-terrorism. His solution was to conduct regular domestic and foreign terrorist threat assessments on the entire range of potential adversarial attacks, not just what he called, “high-end” threats such as chemical, biological, and nuclear “worst-case scenarios.” Secondly, he stated that a comprehensive intelligence reform and reorganization was essential as the current system is

¹ The Al-Qaida Training Manual referred to in this document is an Al-Qaida document entitled, Declaration of Jihad against the Country’s Tyrants: Military Series. UK/BM Translation, Government Exhibit 1677-T. This document was written by a member of Al-Qaida and recently used as evidence during a trial of an Al-Qaida terrorist.

anachronistic causing a hole in U.S. defenses. (Hoffman, 2001, p.5-8)

Now that the Taliban have been driven from power, what will become of Al-Qaida? Based on their training methodology and *modus operandi*, how will events in Afghanistan impact them? This thesis hopes to discover these answers, as well as others delineated in future sections.

Though Al-Qaida was largely based in Afghanistan, it has operatives all around the world. When the United States declared a “war on terrorism” and attacked Al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan, government planners believed this would strike at the heart of the Al-Qaida infrastructure and cripple its ability to prosecute further terrorist attacks. But did it?

Afghanistan’s ruling body, the Taliban, sponsored and permitted Al-Qaida to operate training camps and indoctrination facilities since it came to power in 1996. Training focused on weapons and explosives. The most sophisticated training facility was located in the capital city of Kabul, which was bombed by the United States the week of October 7, 2002.

This thesis presents an in-depth case analysis of the training methods of the Al-Qaida terrorist group. A translated copy of an Al-Qaida training manual is utilized as a primary source document. This manual is analyzed using the “four frameworks” approach, which was developed in the 1980s by Bolman and Deal. This model was chosen to increase our understanding of the Al-Qaida organization based on perspectives synthesized from sociological, psychological, political science, and anthropological theories. Four specific perspectives or “frames” of Al-Qaida are reviewed. The analysis begins with an Al-Qaida structural overview and analysis of rationality. The second frame discusses Al-Qaida human resource imperatives and organizational “fit.” The third frame is symbolic and reviews organizational myths, rituals, and religion. The final frame discusses Al-Qaida from a political point of view. It focuses on the idea of power and how Al-Qaida intends to achieve its political goals. Research will distinguish types and levels of training, cultural aspects and how they influence training, as well as, exploring implications for possible future Al-Qaida targets. The

relationship between Al-Qaida training objectives and current events is delineated. Policy-relevant conclusions are also presented.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

When conducting research, it is important to have a goal in mind. One way to achieve this goal is to formulate specific questions that must be answered. In this case, the primary research question is, “How can the four frameworks model enhance our understanding of the Al-Qaida network and its training process?” That being asked, subsidiary research questions also arise, specifically:

1. What is the structural framework of the Al-Qaida training process?
2. What training methods and processes are unique to Al-Qaida?
3. Can Al-Qaida’s training be differentiated into specific categories?
4. What are the human resources implications of the Al-Qaida training process?
5. How does this training program take care of participant needs? Or does it?
6. What reward systems exist?
7. How do politics, coalition building, and conflict shape Al-Qaida’s organization and training methodology?
8. Utilizing the symbolic frame, how do culture, kinship, religion, and social ties shape Al-Qaida’s organization and training process?
9. What are the implications of the destruction of Al-Qaida training camps?
10. Is this an effective way to decrease Al-Qaida membership and ability to conduct terrorist attacks?
11. What alternatives exist to decrease Al-Qaida membership?
12. And finally, based on Al-Qaida’s organization and training methodology, can one predict future targets?

C. SCOPE AND METHOD OF THE THESIS

The scope of the thesis includes a detailed review of the Al-Qaida training manual as well as a literature review of all open source Al-Qaida-related training and history related documents, articles, and reports. Research focuses on the translated manual, as it is a detailed primary source. Secondary sources are vague and incomplete. Once the training methodology is gleaned, it is analyzed using the four organizational frames model. It is hoped that the detail present in the thesis will expand intelligence analysts' understanding of the Al-Qaida terrorist group.

D. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH

This thesis is intended to benefit U.S. military and civilian terrorist analysts and Intelligence communities by providing a timely, detailed reference of the Al-Qaida terrorist network and an analysis of its organization and training processes. By understanding the Al-Qaida training focus and methodology, it is hoped that the mystique surrounding the group and its leader will be dispelled and future terrorism analysis and counterterrorism policy decisions will be improved.

E. THESIS ORGANIZATION

The following chapter contains a background on the definitions and elements of terrorism, followed by an overview of the Al-Qaida Terrorist group from their perspective. The last section presents the four frameworks model with an explanation as to why it was chosen for analysis. The first sub-section defines the structural frame and discusses its component parts. The second sub-section discusses the merits and difficulties of the human resources frame. The third sub-section describes the symbolic frame and how it is critical to the understanding of an organization. The fourth sub-section focuses on the political frame specifically with respect to negotiation, coalition building, and the concept of power. The chapter concludes with a summary and assessment.

Chapter III reviews literature on the subject of middle-eastern terrorism in general and Al-Qaida specifically. Section one focuses on the revival of Islam in the twentieth century as well as the appearance of Middle Eastern terrorist groups. Section two describes Al-Qaida in terms of its history, leadership, objectives, ideology, and structure. Section three delineates the content of the Al-Qaida training manual. The chapter concludes with a summary and assessment of the data.

Chapter IV is the core of the thesis. General hypotheses about Al-Qaida are delineated. Then, data from the Al-Qaida training manual is incorporated into each of the four frames and analyzed to present a comprehensive picture of the terrorist group and their methodology, specifically addressing the characteristics of the group that are structural, human resource related, symbolic, and political. The next five presents an Al-Qaida policy review, followed by an analysis of current events and how they support the continued use of the training manual. The chapter concludes with a summary and assessment of this data.

Chapter V delineates conclusions based on the research, establishes recommendations for the intelligence communities and terrorist policy makers, summarizes and reviews original primary and secondary research questions, and presents suggested areas for further research on the subject.

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II. BACKGROUND

*When a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight,
it concentrates his mind wonderfully.*

Samuel Johnson (Bryson, 1995, p.104)

A. INTRODUCTION

“As Samuel Johnson observed, albeit humorously, frightening situations quickly focus one’s attention on what is important” (Bryson, 1995, p.104). September 11, 2001 was a pivotal moment in United States history, when terrorism was brought to the forefront of the American mind. This chapter presents a brief overview of the definitions and elements of terrorism, the story of Al-Qaida’s creation and progress from their point of view, and a discussion of the four frameworks model and why it is an important tool in the analysis of the Al-Qaida terrorist group. The chapter concludes with a summary and assessment of the above.

B. TERRORISM: DEFINITIONS AND ELEMENTS

Terrorism is an ancient concept. It dates back thousands of years. The word itself was first used in the French Revolution to mean a system to establish order during a period of chaos (*regime de la terreur*), (Hoffman, 1998, p.15). Much has changed since 1793. Today, the word has a negative connotation and a variety of definitions. The world now has over 100 designated terrorist groups, each with their own objectives, values, and sense of right and wrong (Hoffman, 1998, p.15). This thesis will focus on one specific terrorist group, Al-Qaida. However, to understand Al-Qaida, one must have a basic understanding of terrorism and its history.

Terrorism is complex; it can be defined in a variety of ways. For the purposes of this discussion, I have chosen The US State Department, US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and US Department of Defense (DoD) definitions as a basis for conceptual understanding. While they do not encompass all possible iterations of the idea, they provide a point of departure from which to move forward to an analysis of Al-Qaida (Hoffman, 1998, p.38).

Under Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f)(d), the US State Department defines terrorism as the, “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups of clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (*Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, 2000, p.viii*).

The FBI states that terrorism is, “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (*Terrorism in the United States 1995, 1996, p.ii*). DoD defines terrorism as, “the unlawful use of – or threatened use of – force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives” (*Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, 1990, p.3*).

The DoD definition is arguably the most complete, but interestingly omits the social objectives mentioned in the FBI definition. Bruce Hoffman proposes that terrorism is mainly political; it is about the pursuit, acquisition, and use of power to achieve political change. With that in mind, terrorism is calculated, planned, and systematic. It can utilize violence or the threat of violence to achieve its ends (Hoffman, 1998, p.14- 15). Or as Jenkins stated in 1974, “Terrorism is theatre” (Jenkins, 1975, p.16). In an article in Current History, Arquilla and Rafuoldt recently posited that terrorism is becoming a form of war. In 1984, Alex Schmid reviewed over 100 definitions of terrorism and compiled a list of elements and the percentage of times they appeared in these definitions. The following table is a breakdown of his findings.

Though we are not any closer to a definition of terrorism, Schmid’s elements help us distinguish between terrorism and other types of violence. Again, it is a subjective call. Not all elements are necessarily equal, nor do they all appear in a particular terrorist group. These elements are a framework to assist in understanding the potential actions of a terrorist group with the elements of high frequency appearing more than the elements of a lower frequency (Hoffman, 1998, p.40).

C. AL-QAIDA: THEIR PERSPECTIVE

The reason the previous section focused on how to identify terrorism is because Al-Qaida do not consider themselves terrorists. They firmly believe they are “freedom fighters” trying to overthrow an oppressive regime. The following is a description of Al-Qaida from their perspective. It briefly explains why they formed, their objectives, and previous targets. A more succinct, world-view description of Al-Qaida and its activities is presented in Chapter Three, Section 3.

In 1989, a group of Arab *freedom fighters* (mujahideen) were ousted from Afghanistan and branded as murderers. This group of men had just spent the last five to ten years of their lives fighting against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Sent by religious establishments in their countries, fighters came from many countries:

Saudi Arabia	15,000
Yemen	5,000
Egypt	3,000-5,000
Algeria	2,000
Gulf	1,000
Libya	1,000
Iraq	several hundred

They became known as “Arab Afghans.” They formed close bonds during the struggle. Once heroes, they now became outcasts. However, they were not satisfied with their disgrace and vowed to prove to the world that they were true patriots, fighting for a just cause. They became known as *Al-Qaida* (The Base), (Huband, 1998, p.2).

Led by Osama bin Laden, the Arab Afghans followed him and other leaders to Sudan where they lived and worked to expand their cause. Sponsored by the government of Sudan, Al-Qaida’s front construction, transportation, and leather manufacturing companies received choice contracts for the next six years.

Other Arab Afghans relocated around the world in areas such as Philippines, London, New Jersey. “At least 200 former Arab Afghan fighters are thought to live in New York and New Jersey” (James, 1995, p.175-179).

In 1996, the Taliban regime seized power in Afghanistan from the warlords that were rampaging the countryside after the Soviet withdrawal. They invited Al-Qaida back to Afghanistan and gave them permission to create training camps and recruit members from the population. Training focused on weapons and explosives. The most sophisticated training facility was located in the capital city of Kabul, which was bombed by the United States the week of October 7, 2002 and in the following weeks.

In December 1999, Al-Qaida members were arrested in Jordan for planning operations against Western tourists visiting holy sites. The group was also implicated in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa and the 2001 World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings in the United States (*Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, 2000*, p.7).

As its message spread, a disciple of Al-Qaida was inspired to write a training manual as his contribution to the effort. This manual became a cornerstone document with which to select and train new Al-Qaida members. This document was acquired in 2001 from an arrested Al-Qaida member and is the basis for the current analysis of the Al-Qaida training methodology. Chapter Three reviews the contents of this document and Chapter Four analyzes the data using the Four Frameworks Model described below.

D. FOUR FRAMEWORKS MODEL

This section distinguishes and describes the four frameworks model and each of the frames (structural, human resources, symbolic, and political). As we have seen, terrorism and the Al-Qaida network are complex concepts. In order to understand them, the four frameworks model is chosen to broaden the terrorist analyst repertoire by enhancing their understanding of Al-Qaida and allowing them to formulate alternative responses based on the presented data. Bolman and Deal state that it is critical to understand that all problems have many alternatives. Through reframing our knowledge of the Al-Qaida, creative solutions to the war on terrorism and destruction of the Al-Qaida network can be discovered (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.6).

Table 2-1: Frequencies of Definitional Elements of 109 Definitions of “Terrorism”

Element	Frequency (%)
1 Violence, force	83.5
2 Political	65
3 Fear, terror emphasized	51
4 Threat	47
5 (Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions	41.5
6 Victim – target differentiation	37.5
7 Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32
8 Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5
9 Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30
10 Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28
11 Publicity aspect	21.5
12 Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination	21
13 Civilians, non-combatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17.5
14 Intimidation	17
15 Innocence of Victims emphasized	15.5
16 Group, movement, organization as perpetrator	14
17 Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others	13.5
18 Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9
19 Clandestine, covert nature	9
20 Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence	7
21 Criminal	6
22 Demands made on third parties	4

Source: Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman et al., Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988, pp 5-6.

In the 1980s, Bolman and Deal created the four frameworks model. Their goal was to obtain a better understanding of organizations. They incorporated theories from political science, sociology, anthropology, and psychology as well as observations of the machinations of scores of organizations. The data were synthesized into four perspectives, or “frames” that work in practice and make sense in understanding organizations (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.13).

The following is a synopsis of the four frames and its critical components.

Table 2-2: Four Frameworks Model Overview

		<i>Frame</i>		
	<i>Structural</i>	<i>Human Resources</i>	<i>Symbolic</i>	<i>Political</i>
Metaphor for Organization	Factory or machine	Family	Carnival, temple, theater	Jungle
Central Concepts	Rules, roles, goals, policies, technology, environment	Needs, skills, relationships	Culture, meaning, metaphor, ritual, ceremony, stories, heroes	Power, conflict, competition, organizational politics
Image of Leadership	Social architecture	Empowerment	Inspiration	Advocacy
Basic Leadership Challenge	Attune structure to task, technology, environment	Align organizational and human needs	Create faith, beauty, meaning	Develop agenda and power base

Source: Bolman, Lee G. and Deal, Terrence E., Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership, 2nd Ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997, p 15.

1. Structural Frame

The first frame is *structural* and emphasizes formal relationships, goals, and specialized roles. A visual example is an organizational chart, but it also references technology, environment, rules, and hierarchies. The goal is to understand how organizations create policies and procedures while allocating responsibilities to its participants to successfully accomplish

diverse activities. Bolman and Deal felt that a mismatch between structure and a situation would cause problems necessitating a reorganization (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.13-14).

Structural designs are infinite and are limited only by human ingenuity and choice. This frame assumes rationality and believes that formal arrangements increase performance and quality, while minimizing problems. It focuses on collective goals, while accommodating individual differences. According to Bolman and Deal, the structural frame contains six assumptions.

1. Organizations exist to achieve established goals and objectives.
2. Organizations function best when rationality prevails over personal preferences and external pressures.
3. Structures must be designed to fit an organization's circumstances.
4. Organizations enhance performance and increase efficiency through specialization and division of labor.
5. Organizations need appropriate forms of control and coordination to ensure individuals and units work together to obtain an organization's goals.
6. Problems and gaps in performance due to structural deficiencies can be fixed through restructuring (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.39-40).

Two basic tensions lie within this frame: how to allocate work and how to coordinate these roles once a task is distributed (division of labor). Mintzberg states that groups or units can be based on skill, time, product, clients, geography, or process. Unfortunately, the moment one places people into specialized units, coordination and control are negatively impacted. Bolman and Deal state that vertical and lateral coordination can rectify this problem (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.40-42).

Vertical coordination dictates that higher levels control the lower echelon through rules and policies, planning and control systems, and authority. Bolman and Deal state that this may not always be effective, though it is efficient. It is, however, preferable in stable environments where tasks are predictable and understood and where uniformity is critical (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.42-43).

Bolman and Deal offer the lateral coordination option as the optimal as well as simpler and quicker system. Lateral coordination is a flatter structure that uses meetings (formal or

informal), task forces, coordinating roles, matrix structures, and network organizations to achieve coordination and control. These authors believe that a more informal structure will positively affect people's behavior in an organization. This type of communications works best in fast-paced environments that are turbulent and require complex tasking (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.44-47).

In order to design a successful structure, six structural imperatives or characteristics must be taken into account. The following table defines the imperatives and reviews their implications.

Table 2-3: Structural Imperatives

Dimension	Structural Implications
<i>Size and Age</i>	Complexity and formalization increase with size and age.
<i>Core Process</i>	Core processes or technologies must align with structure.
<i>Environment</i>	Stable environments reward simpler structure; uncertain, turbulent environments require more complex, adaptable structure.
<i>Strategy and Goals</i>	Variations in clarity and consistency of goals require appropriate structural adaptations.
<i>Information Technology</i>	Information technology permits flatter, more flexible, and more decentralized structure.
<i>Nature of the Workforce</i>	More educated and professional workers need and want greater autonomy and discretion.

Source: Bolman, Lee G. and Deal, Terrence E., Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership, 2nd Ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997, p 49.

Once structural imperatives are reviewed and the complexity of an organization is determined, analysts are faced with a maximum of nine structural dilemmas or “trade-offs. These dilemmas include: differentiation versus integration, gaps versus overlaps, underuse versus overload, lack of clarity versus lack of creativity, excessive autonomy versus excessive interdependence, too loose versus too tight, diffuse authority versus over-centralization, goalless versus goalbound, and irresponsive versus unresponsive (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.60-61).

The Differentiation versus Integration dilemma demonstrates that more people doing

different things limits an organization's ability integrate or focus its efforts (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.60-61).

The Gaps versus Overlaps dilemma states that gaps occur when responsibilities are not clearly defined and important jobs may go undone. Alternately, overlap creates conflicts, redundancies, and wasted effort (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.60-61).

The Underuse versus Overload dilemma compares people who are underutilized and, therefore, bored to those who are overworked and, therefore, edgy, tense, and burnt out (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.60-61).

Lack of Clarity versus Lack of Creativity describes the dilemma of role miscommunication. If members of an organization are unclear about their roles, they often devise their own based on personal preferences. Too strict or overdefined roles cause rigid compliance with no room for deviation or creativity (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.60-61).

The Excessive Autonomy versus Excessive Interdependence dilemma pertains to the feeling of member isolation and non-support if they are too autonomous versus distraction and wasted time for unnecessary coordination if roles are too tightly linked or interdependent (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.60-61).

The Too Loose versus Too Tight dilemma states that if a structure is too loose, people lose their way and have little sense of what others are doing in the organization. If the structure is too tight, flexibility is stifled and cause members to spend too much time trying to circumvent the system (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.60-61).

The Diffuse Authority versus Overcentralization dilemma causes member confusion, conflict, and limits initiative if they do not know who has control over what (Diffuse Authority) versus sluggish and clumsy decision making because of too many layers of authority (Overcentralization), (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.60-61).

The Goalless versus Goalbound dilemma talks about how some people do not know what the goals are versus clinging to goals even after they are obsolete (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.60-61).

Finally, the Irresponsive versus Unresponsive dilemma considers that when members

relinquish their responsibilities or adhere too rigidly to regulations, performance suffers. Similarly, turning down every request alienates the members. While not all dilemmas may be present in an organization, it is critical to ascertain where along the continuum an organization's dilemmas do lie. This will assist the analyst in determining an organization's structure and potential problems as a result of it (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.60-61).

The structural frame examines the social context of organizations. It looks beyond the individual. If this frame is overlooked, energy and resources can be misdirected. With changes in the workforce, technology, and the environment, traditional hierarchies are disappearing and new structural forms are emerging. As Deal and Kennedy (1982) predicted, networked organizations that are small, autonomous, geographically dispersed, and tied together by information technology and symbolism are emerging. By understanding organizational complexity and structural dimensions, one can comprehend an organization's strengths, weaknesses, focus, and environment. This frame is critical in enhancing the analyst's understanding of organizations (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.56-58).

2. Human Resources Frame

The second frame is *human resources* and focuses on concepts from psychology. This frame views organizations in terms of a family and recognizes that like a family, participants have needs, limitations, skills, prejudices, and feelings. Additionally, it assumes that individuals have a great capacity to learn as well as defend established beliefs and attitudes. The key challenge in this frame is to discover a way to get members to do their job while enjoying what they do. It assumes that people's contribution to an organization is vital and can determine whether or not an organization succeeds. It is based on the idea that organizational environments are positive, rewarding and energizing places rather than oppressive and callous (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.14, 102).

In order to understand the symbiotic relationship between members and their organization, Bolman and Deal have developed four core assumptions:

1. Organizations exist to serve human needs rather than the reverse.
2. People and organizations need each other: people need opportunities and salaries;

organizations need talent, ideas, and energy.

3. When the fit between members and an organization is poor, one or both will suffer.
4. A good fit benefits both parties (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.102).

If one accepts Bolman and Deal's assumption that human needs are paramount in an organization, one must understand what "needs" people have. According to Abraham Maslow's "hierarchy of need" concept, needs fall into five categories:

1. Physiological (basic survival needs of food, water, oxygen, shelter)
2. Safety (safe from danger or attack)
3. Love and Belongingness (positive, loving relationships with others)
4. Esteem (value of oneself and others)
5. Self-actualization (the need to develop to one's full potential) (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.104-105)

According to his theory, the lower needs must be satisfied first. Few people ever reach the fifth level (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.105). Douglas McGregor added to this theory by positing that people's assumptions of others become a "self-fulfilling prophecy." What they expect a person to do, they invariably do. He developed the *Theory X and Theory Y* concept, which states that managers usually have "Theory X" assumptions about their workers. That is, they believe them to be lazy, passive, resistant to change, and lacking ambition. As a result, managers use threats, coercion, strict rules, and punishment to control their employees. This ultimately decreases productivity and increases antagonism. If the manager tries to avoid conflict and satisfy employee's needs, harmony may only be superficial and the result is indifference or apathy to the job or task. "Theory Y" states that managers are aware that employees have needs and try to accommodate those needs. The manager assists the member in achieving personal goals and directs their efforts with a system of rewards. This self-direction increases organization as well as personal production and achievement (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.105-106).

Chris Argyris argues that people seek self-actualization in their jobs. In other words they dislike the mundane as they mature and seek to improve their personal abilities. Argyris states that if an employee is forced into repetitive tasks, he gets frustrated and can retaliate

against the organization in at least six ways. These include physical absence from the job, psychological withdrawal, sabotage, jockey for a better position, form groups to redress the power imbalance, and socialize their children to the fact that work is unrewarding and chances for advancement are minimal (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.109-110).

As demonstrated, the human element in an organization is critical. The following table is a compilation of human resource strategies and ways to achieve them.

Table 2-4: Basic Human Resources Strategies

Human Resource Strategy	Practices
Develop a Long-Term Human Resource Philosophy	Build the philosophy into corporate structure and incentives
	Develop measures of human resource management
Invest in people	Hire the right people and reward them well
	Provide job security
	Promote from within
	Train and educate
	Share the wealth
Empower employees and redesign their work	Provide autonomy and participation
	Focus on job enrichment
	Emphasize teamwork
	Ensure egalitarianism and upward influence

Source: Bolman, Lee G. and Deal, Terrence E., Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership, 2nd Ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997, p 123.

A final consideration on the Human Resources Frame is interpersonal dynamics. An organization is about people interacting with one another. If this interface is broken, the organization and the people will suffer. Argyris and Schon defined two theories that deal with relationship problems. The first is the “espoused theory,” which deals with perception. Managers may feel they are fair, open-minded, and listen to their employees when in reality they are controlling, defensive, and antagonistic. The “Model I” theory assumes all organizations are

competitive and dangerous to the individual. If these concepts are in use within an organization, the results are defensiveness, wasted energy, poor decisions, lack of accountability, and strained relationships. Argyris and Schon posit that these theories could be replaced with “Model II” or the idea that common goals, mutual influence, open communication, and the combination of advocacy with inquiry can be emphasized. They believe that this behavior would promote positive dialogue and increase the unity of the group, ultimately increasing employee satisfaction and, therefore, organization productivity (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.144-149).

As demonstrated, people are a key ingredient in the success of an organization. A human resources mismatch between employees and their organization results in inefficiencies and chaos. Therefore, the human resource frame is a key to understanding a plethora of organizational underpinnings and assumptions and is critical to any analytic review.

3. Symbolic Frame

The third frame is *symbolic* and utilizes concepts from cultural and social anthropology. It conceptualizes organizations as a carnival, tribe, or theater. It focuses on the irrational more so than the other frames. Organizations are really cultures that concentrate on stories, myths, and heroes rather than procedure, authority, and rules. As actors on a stage, organization members play roles designed to impact an audience outside the organization. If the act is played poorly, problems could arise. If an organization’s symbols lose meaning, the organization itself could be in danger. This can be resolved by creating new symbols, myths, or rituals (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.14).

The symbolic frame seeks to understand why symbols can be so powerful in an organization. It utilizes faith, belief, and meaning as its central tenets. It defines who the employees are and why they do what they do. It embodies and creates the organization’s culture, which is both a process and a product. The process is the constant evolution of the culture. The product is the accumulation of past wisdom. Life in an organization is fluid rather than linear. It is constantly changing and altering course (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.216-217).

The symbolic frame has six key assumptions:

1. The importance of an event is its meaning, not what happened.

2. Events have many meanings as people have different interpretations.
3. Life is uncertain and ambiguous, what happened, why, and what happens next are puzzles.
4. Ambiguity prevents rational analysis, problem solving, and decision making.
5. As a result of ambiguity, people create symbols to provide direction, decrease confusion, increase predictability, and anchor faith and hope.
6. Events and processes form a cultural tapestry of secular myths, stories, ceremonies, rituals that assist people in finding passion, purpose, and meaning (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.216).

The symbolic frame utilizes many tools to describe organizational actions and policies. The first is a myth. Myths are stories with a story, according to Campbell and say much more, according to him (Campbell, 1988). Cohen states they anchor the present in the past, explain, legitimize, and create solidarity and cohesion (Cohen, 1969). This is the positive side. A negative view is that they can prevent people from seeing current opportunities and new information. Stories are a second tool that helps people find direction and hope, comfort and reassure because they “externalize inner conflicts and tensions.” They also convey an organization’s morals and values (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.220-221). Rituals and ceremonies are tools that give an organization structure. They clarify roles, predict events, convey messages, and anchor a person to the group. Ceremonies are more formalized, elaborate, and occur less frequently, thereby, providing a stronger meaning (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.222-223, 227). Humor, metaphor, and play are also critical elements to the symbolic frame. All serve to dissipate threatening concepts. They simplify difficult concepts into an “as if” quality of symbols. Humor and play in particular decrease situational seriousness, increase solidarity, and allow honor if one makes a mistake. All symbolic tools collate into an organizational culture, which drives and defines the organization (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.229-231).

Bolman and Deal postulate that organizational processes are really theater. For example, a meeting is really a stage on which members of the organization (actors) can practice their “lines”, clarify their “parts,” and watch a collective “drama.” Additionally, organizational planning becomes an excuse for interaction. Plans are symbols; they become games and

advertisements for the organization. Evaluations encourage the sharing of ideas and opinions, social interaction, and an opportunity to be recognized publicly. It is high theater as participants wear more formal “costumes” and act in a different “role” during the “drama” of the interview (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.241-245).

The symbolic frame presents an added dimension to an organization. Without knowing the meaning behind the words and actions of an organization, salient points of analysis are missed. It is therefore critical to include a review of the symbolic frame for further clarity and understanding of an organization.

4. Political Frame

The fourth frame is *political* and derived from political theory. In Pfeffer’s book, Managing with Power, he defines power as, “the potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do what they would not otherwise do” (Pfeffer, 1992, p.30). Russ defines it as the ability “to make one’s will prevail and to attain one’s goal” (Russ, 1994, p.38). Bolman and Deal see organizations in terms of jungles and arenas where people compete for scarce resources, are forced to bargain and negotiate, and form coalitions for survival. Power is the ultimate goal in the political frame. As such, conflict is the order of the day when dealing with differing personalities, agendas, and needs. As Machiavelli states in The Prince, ([1514] 1961) the only way to deal with this type of situation is to solve it with political skill and acumen. Otherwise, power would be concentrated in the wrong place or if too dispersed, nothing would be accomplished (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.14).

As in the other frames, the political frame has basic assumptions:

1. Organizations are coalitions of various individuals and interest groups.
2. Coalition members have “enduring differences” in information, beliefs, values, interests, and perceptions of reality.
3. Most important decisions involve allocation of scarce resources.
4. As a result of enduring differences and scarce resources, *conflict* is the central role in organizational dynamics and *power* is the most important resource.
5. Goals and decisions emerge from bargaining, negotiation, and jockeying for position among different stakeholders (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.163).

However, the ultimate focus is on the concept of power. Pfeffer identifies eight bases of power: positional, informational, control of rewards, coercive, alliances and networks, access and control of agendas, framing through the control of symbols and meaning, and personal. This is different from the structural frame, which emphasizes positional authority. The person at the top makes the decisions, monitors actions, ensures tasks are carried out, and evaluates the result. It is a rational process and no one challenges it. The human resources frame focuses on “empowerment,” or the limit of power and authority. Its goal is to integrate organization and member needs and create a “win-win” situation for all parties. In the symbolic frame, power is a tangible but occurs as the result of a leader’s ability to be a good actor, tell a good story, inspire workers, and get employee buy-in on issues (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.167, 247).

As conflict plays a central role in this frame, resolution of conflict is not a concern. The focus is on strategy and tactics. The idea is that as conflict always exists, how do we make the best of it? Savage states that understanding a stakeholder’s potential for threat or cooperation is a key factor. A stakeholder is defined as one who determines the success of an organization. This is based on their leverage and satisfaction. For instance, if a stakeholder is more powerful than an organization, the potential for threat increases. If a stakeholder supports the organization’s viewpoint, the potential for threat decreases. “Generally, the more dependent the organization, the more powerful the stakeholder” (Savage, 1991, p.63-64 and Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.171-172).

Bolman and Deal state three types of conflict occur primarily at interfaces between groups. The first is horizontal conflict, which occurs between departments or committees. The second is vertical conflict, which occurs up and down the chain of command or levels. The third is cultural conflict, which occurs when a group contains a diversity of morals, values, and beliefs (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.173). However, not all conflict is necessarily bad. According to Heffron, conflict can increase creativity, encourage new ideas, and stimulate curiosity. It is the root of personal and social change” (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.172).

Four skills are necessary to successfully maneuver the political frame. The first is

agenda setting, which includes outlining goals, scheduling activities, and understanding stakeholder concerns. The second is mapping the political terrain. This includes: determining informal channels of communication, identifying who has the political influence, analysis of the potential for internal and external mobilization, and anticipating enemy strategies. The third skill is networking and forming coalitions. The fourth is bargaining and negotiation (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.179-186).

As demonstrated above, the political frame is not based on rationality. The world is an arena for contests of power. Only the most savvy survive. Conflict controls all interactions. Coalitions, strategy, and tactics are the key tools for success. However, understanding the good and bad aspects of power in an organization will only enhance one's understanding of the overall organization.

5. Utility of Four Frames

Normally, an individual focuses on one or two frames, according to his/her preference, to make sense of an organization. This preference is based on knowledge and experience. However, decisions based on only one or two frames can be faulty or incomplete. When one utilizes all four frames for analysis, one can gain a more comprehensive understanding of an organization because of the availability of more data. As Roberts and King stated in their article, "The Stakeholder Audit Goes Public," structuring and organizing data in new and different ways helps reveal previously hidden themes and patterns (Roberts and King, 1989, p.76).

E. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT

As seen above, terrorism is a complex topic with a multitude of definitions. While there is no one all-encompassing definition, certain terrorist traits can be distinguished. While Al-Qaida does not consider itself a terrorist group, its actions demonstrate otherwise, in our view.

The four frameworks model will be the key analytic tool to assist in the understanding of Al-Qaida. Due to its seeming complexity, it may be tempting to choose only one or two frames for analysis of an organization. However, the utilization of all four frames is essential for a

complete picture of the workings of an organization. A complete, multi-frame analysis will provide unique alternatives and novel ideas about an organization that would not otherwise be readily apparent. Through the use of a translated training manual, Al-Qaida will be analyzed based on structure, human resources, symbolic, and political frames of reference. This occurs in Chapter Four and is the cornerstone for conclusions and recommendations presented in Chapter Five to the intelligence community and terrorism policy makers (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.6).

This author believes that the four frameworks model is a very useful tool to our understanding of the Al-Qaida terrorist group. By enhancing our understanding of Al-Qaida, alternative responses may be formulated that may lead to creative solutions to the war on terrorism and destruction of the Al-Qaida network.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

*So it is said that if you know others and know yourself,
you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles...*

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*
(Bryson, 1995, p.82)

A. INTRODUCTION

Chapter three reviews literature relating to terrorism, Al-Qaida, and discusses the Al-Qaida training manual. Section one presents an overview of Islam, its revival, and the rise of Middle Eastern terrorism. Section two discusses the Al-Qaida chronology of terrorist actions, Osama bin Laden and his contribution to the group, and Al-Qaida ideology, objectives, and structure. Section three delineates the contents of a recently translated Al-Qaida training manual. The chapter concludes with a summary and assessment.

B. ISLAM AND MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM

Islam is the second largest religion in the world and is 1400 years old. One and a half billion people practice this religion and the largest concentration is in Indonesia. Arabs are 18 percent of the Muslim population. The word Islam means “peace” or “submission to the will of god.” The Koran is the holy book based on revelations sent to the prophet Muhammad in the cities of Mecca and Medina in the early seventh century. He preached monotheism, social reform, and redress of injustices. Five basic tenets of Islam are: 1) declaration of faith, 2) prayer five times a day, 3) “zakat” or charitable giving, 4) the “hajj” or pilgrimage to Mecca, and 5) fasting during the month of Ramadan (Fernandez, 2001, p.2).

Definitions that are helpful in understanding Islam include Jihad, Shariah, Hadith, Fatwa, Sheikh, and Imam. *Jihad* literally means to struggle, strive, and exert effort. It is a broad concept that includes “struggle against evil inclinations within oneself, struggle to improve the quality of life in society, struggle in the battlefield through self-defense or fighting against tyranny and oppression” (Fernandez, 2001, p.2). “Mainstream” Muslims state that Jihad has been corrupted to mean a military “holy war” by extremist groups. However, its real focus is an

intellectual or moral struggle (Reuters, Sep 18, 2001, p.1).

“Shariah is Islam’s constitution or laws derived from the Koran.

Hadith are the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad.

Fatwa is a legal opinion or decree issues by a qualified jurist or religious scholar.

Sheikh is an academic scholar.

Imam is a spiritual or prayer leader” (Fernandez, 2001, p.2).

According to Desmond McForan, Middle Eastern discontent begins with the rise of Arab nationalism at the end of the Ottoman Empire. In 1914, the political climate forced this movement underground and several secret societies were formed. In the early 1950s, Palestinian students at the American University in Beirut founded the Arab Nationalist’ Movement, ANM (Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-Arab). Its goal was to unify Arab lands and restore the “Arab nation to its former glory” (McForan, 1986, p.3). The ANM chose four methods to accomplish this: subjugate Israel, eradicate Western influence from the Middle East, regenerate the Arab people through social and economic means, and politically integrate all Arab countries (McForan, 1986, p.3).

This movement spurred the creation of even more radical groups who wanted to take these objectives one step further and return to Islamic fundamentalism and destroy Islamic “failures” such as “the royal sheikdoms and monarchs of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf region, and Morocco” (McForan, 1986, p.17). Religious idealism became the focus and a desire to return to the ways of the Prophet Muhammad became paramount (McForan, 1986, p.3).

Concurrent with the development of secret societies, Islamic literature began a revival. It espoused the de-colonization of the Muslim world and the creation of an independent, viable, modern Islamic society. It stated that Islamic territory was redefined by colonial powers and new national identities had been formed. Two schools of thought emerged: modernist and socialist. The modernists believed that Islamic teachings should be harmonized with Western philosophy and science. They quoted Surah 13:12 in the Koran. “God will not alter what is in a people until they alter what is in themselves” (Haddad, 1991, p.5). The socialists stressed the concept of renewal (*tajdid*), which is the necessity for centennial reform, renewal, and regeneration of the faith. Part of the theory included the coming of a renewer of the faith

(*mujaddid*) every 100 years to restore the teachings of Islam.

Initially, both schools were very careful not to advocate violence. However, as time passed, literature began to depict the Islamic world as surrounded by “hostile forces bent on their destruction” (Haddad, 1991, p.6). In the 1960s, advocates of Islamic revolutionism stated that it was a Muslim divine imperative to overthrow any non-Islamic state. It was said that the West, particularly the U.S., had lost its morality and social values. Organizations such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, made this their rallying cry (Haddad, 1991, p.6-7). This was the prelude to the development of Middle Eastern guerrilla and terrorist groups.

According to Wilkinson, terrorist and guerrilla tactics can and should be distinguished from one another. He states three elements can be used to determine if unconventional warfare is terroristic in nature: “the aims of its perpetrators, their modus operandi in deploying particular forms of violence upon the victims, and the target audience” (Wilkinson, 1986, p.x). He further states that eight questions can be applied to determine if a violent act is terrorism: 1) “is it indiscriminate in the selection of victims, 2) arbitrary and unpredictable, 3) does not provide for non-combatant status or the other rules of warfare, 4) observes no moral constraints on weaponry and tactics, 5) justifies any means to achieve its ends, 6) regards extreme violence as inspirational and the most effective means available, 7) regards vengeance as a moral necessity, and 8) justifies the use of terror to avoid the greater evil represented by the enemy” (Wilkinson, 1986, p.54). Benjamin Netanyahu contrasts guerrilla and terrorists based on the means employed. He states, “Those who deliberately butcher women and children do not have liberation in mind. The choice of means indicates what the true ends are” (Netanyahu, 1986, p.12).

According to Chaliand, guerrilla warfare occurs in response to ethnic or religious oppression that is perceived as unacceptable. He states there are several phases, the first of which is the recruitment of members to form a core party. This core is taught the nature of the oppression and vulnerability of the enemy. Once established, additional members are recruited. These members include the young, city dwellers who are semi-intelligent, semi-intellectual, marginalized, have no prospects, and are seething with discontent. The hardest group to recruit

is the most downtrodden; those who have no hope for change and long habits of subservience have little interest in risk-taking. The next stage is to gain popular support. Tactics utilized are intimidation, persuasion, agitation, indoctrination, and the selective use of terror. The guerrillas need to demonstrate that the enemy is vulnerable and the struggle is just. A charismatic leader gains the popular support quicker. A clearly defined enemy results in clearer targets. If the struggle is anticipated to be long, the group must be disciplined, strong, and austere. In order to succeed, the group needs legitimacy, which can be gained through the support of the population. However, support may be lost through weariness, injustice, or psychological error. As we will see with Afghanistan, terrain, size of country, external aid, and number of safe areas can be decisive. An area with poor communications is ideal for insurgents (Chaliand, 1987, p.46-47, 49, 51-54, 58).

In 1978, Afghanistan was rocked by a series of spontaneous uprisings, which rejected the Marxist Kabul government and its religious, ethnic, and social policies. The invasion of the Soviet military in 1979 added a dimension of struggle against a foreign incursion. The result was six movements fighting a guerrilla war for a regional audience along traditional lines. Though the country is small, the terrain is mountainous, populations are dispersed, and the communications network is weak. The movement was defined by a lack of strategy, massive but unorganized support, and limited tactical skill. In 1989, the guerrillas succeeded because of U.S. equipment and training aid, manpower supplied by sympathetic Middle Eastern countries, a Pakistani sanctuary, which moved arms, medical supplies, and equipment to the battlefield, as well as a weak counter-insurgency by the Soviets (Chaliand, 1987, p.62). Later, we will see how the Afghanistan guerrillas evolved into Al-Qaida terrorists.

Of the many Middle Eastern terrorist groups formed during this period, the most influential on Al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden was the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). Ayman Al Zawahiri was a leader of the EIJ and believed to be Osama bin Laden's doctor and advisor. He was also a co-founder of the "Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders" AKA Al-Qaida and a member of Al-Qaida's "consultation council" (CNS, 2001, p.3). Muhammad Atef (Abu Haffs al Masri), an original member of the EIJ, is now a member of Al-

Qaida's "consultation council" and the chief of military operations responsible for training members of Al-Qaida (CNS, 2001, p.3).

Osama bin Laden was also influenced by 18th century Wahhabism, a splinter movement within Sunnism. This doctrine argues for the puritanical exclusion of modern innovation and the use of military force to achieve their purpose (Fernandez, 2001, p.2). Al-Qaida, the Taliban regime, and the Philippine terrorist group, Abu Sayyaf, subscribe to this ideology. According to Adeeb Khalid, an associate professor of history at Carleton College, in St. Paul, Minneapolis, "...strictness is not necessarily a direct interpretation of the Koran" (CQ Researcher, 2001, p.41). Amy Standen, author of Islam and the Religion of Terrorism, states that "bin Laden and the Taliban fail to acknowledge the Koran's specific injunction against the killing of innocent people and fellow Muslims" (CQ Researcher, 2001, p.41). Khaled Abou el Fadl, a law professor at the University of California at Los Angeles, states that bin Laden and the Taliban are selective in their quotations from the Koran. "They often cite a passage that says, 'Fight those who fight you,' but they don't continue the citation. It says, 'Fight them, but don't transgress because God does not love the transgressors.' And 'transgression' means, when you go to war, killing innocent people or non-combatants, such as farmers and hermits" (CQ Researcher, 2001, p.42).

1. The Rise of Terrorist Lethality

According to Bruce Hoffman, terrorist lethality doubled in the 1980s. He states there are five reasons for this: 1) the belief that lethality attracts attention, 2) increased organizational skills, 3) resurgence of religious terrorism, 4) increased aptitude for killing, and 5) increased state-sponsorship. With the increase in skill and intelligence, comes the increase in ruthlessness and decrease in idealism. Violence becomes "an end in itself--a cathartic release, a self-satisfying blow struck against the hated 'system' rather

than being regarded as the deliberate means to a specific political end..." (Hoffman, 1988, p.2 and Hoffman, 1992, p.1, 3, 5).

With the attack on the U.S. embassies in Africa and the World Trade Center, Hoffman

sees a shift in the Brian Jenkins terrorist principle of using the minimum force necessary with only few casualties. Though terrorists continue to use bombings as a principle modus operandi, Hoffman is concerned that they will shift to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), i.e., chemical, biological, and nuclear, as their self-imposed religious and political constraints loosen. Al-Qaida has demonstrated that a terrorist group can successfully attack the United States. This may spur Al-Qaida or other groups to try again (Hoffman, 1992, p.15-17).

To glean a better understanding of terrorism, one must compare types of terrorism. Bruce Hoffman succinctly states the difference between “secular political” terrorism and “religious political” terrorism in the 1988 Rand report, The Contrasting Ethical Foundations of Terrorism in the 1980s.” These concepts apply to all terrorist organizations, not just Middle Eastern terrorists. He states that a secular terrorist’s aim is primarily political. The goal is a quest for power and to create sociopolitical changes within an existing governmental order. Violence is a means to an end. Acts are not committed randomly. Ethical considerations are reviewed based on their object and audience. They understand that mass destruction or bloodshed may result in public revulsion, alienating potential sympathizers, and triggering severe government measures” (Hoffman, 1988, p.4). They consider it immoral and counterproductive. Secular political terrorists are “utilitarian,” seeking the greatest good for the greatest number by changing things (Hoffman, 1988, p.14-15).

In contrast, religious political terrorists seek change based on a theological imperative. The future is divinely decreed. Violence is the end itself. They use power to “defend the faith, to defeat their ‘enemies,’ and to establish a regional, if not global, hegemony” (Hoffman, 1988, p.13). Terrorist acts are seen as a divine duty. It is transcendent; it has no moral, practical, or political constraints. Enemies are broadly defined. Violence is “morally justified and expedient for the attainment of their goals” (Hoffman, 1988, p.13). They are activists engaged in a total war. Their aims are “the attainment of the greatest benefits for themselves” (Hoffman, 1988, p.15). They see themselves as an outsider to the existing systems. This gives them a sense of alienation and allows them to commit more deadly and destructive acts of terrorism (Hoffman, 1988, p.14-15). David Rapoport points out that until the nineteenth century, “religion provided

the only acceptable justifications for terror” (Rapoport, 1984, p.659).

Hoffman posits that terrorists deliberately plan their attacks to achieve five objectives: attention, acknowledgement, recognition, authority, and governance (Hoffman, 1998, p.183-184). He states that the number of religious terrorist groups has been increasing while ethno-nationalistic/separatist groups are declining. He reports that in 1994, 16 of 49 international terrorist groups were classified as religious. In 1995, 26 of 56 were religious. He posits the Cold War left a power vacuum in the former Soviet Union resulting in civil wars and therefore a decreased opportunity or need for terror. Additionally, new nations rapidly attained sovereignty and “terrorism” came to be regarded as an embarrassment. Religious terrorism is mainly focused in to the Middle East, which has been undergoing a revival. The feeling of “encirclement” by Western powers is a strong motivator (Hoffman, 1998, p.91, 96-97). According to Juergensmeyer, Rapoport believes that “religious revivals will always be associated with violence” (Juergensmeyer, 1992, p.7). He outlines five reasons for this: 1) religion can command loyalty and enlist total commitment, 2) the language of religion is suffused with images of violence and sacred war, 3) religion has violent origins, 4) revivalist and apocalyptic doctrines foment religious violence, and 5) religion is connected to politics (Juergensmeyer, 1992, p.7).

Taheri describes three differences between terrorism and Islamic terrorism:

First, it rejects all the contemporary ideologies in their various forms; it sees itself as the total outsider with no option but to take control or to fall, gun in hand....

The second characteristic that distinguishes the Islamic version from other forms of terrorism is that it is clearly conceived and conducted as a form of Holy War which can only end when total victory has been achieved....

The third specific characteristic of Islamic terrorism is that it forms the basis of a whole theory both of individual conduct and of state policy. To kill the enemies of Allah and to offer the infidels the choice between converting to Islam or being put to death is the duty

of every individual believer, as well as the supreme- - if not the sole
- - task of the Islamic state (Taheri, 1987, p.7-8).

C. AL-QAIDA

This section focuses on the history of Al-Qaida attacks, a brief background to include Al-Qaida alias, a profile of Osama bin Laden coupled with the development of the Al-Qaida group, Al-Qaida ideology and objectives, organizational structure, and phases of an Al-Qaida operation. What we find is a very active, organized, and well-funded terrorist group with clearly defined goals, objectives, and targets. Although religious symbolism and strict Islamic interpretations are present throughout the organization and their statements, Al-Qaida is primarily a political organization. Its use of terror and types of targets are driven by geostrategic and geopolitical goals (Rueda, 2001, p.20).

1. Al-Qaida Attack Chronology

Al-Qaida gained notoriety in February 1993 for its bombing of the World Trade Center. This attack killed six and injured over 1,000 others. This event was the catalyst that focused the world's attention on Al-Qaida. The following is a chronology of subsequent Al-Qaida attacks and the impetus for U.S. and international research on the group (Alexander, 2001, p.viii).

- On November 13, 1995, a car bomb killed five Americans and two Indians outside the American-operated Saudi National Guard training center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (CNS, 2001, p.1-4).
- On June 25, 1996, 19 soldiers were killed and hundreds of others were injured in a car bomb attack of the Khobar Towers, a U.S. Air Force housing complex in Dhahran Saudi Arabia (CNS, 2001, p.1-4).
- On August 7, 1998, 234 people were killed and 5,000 injured by two truck bombs outside the U.S. embassies in Dares Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya (Alexander, 2001, p.viii).
- In December 1999, Al-Qaida members were arrested in Jordan for planning terrorist operations against Western tourists visiting holy sites (*Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999*,

2000, p.7).

- On October 12, 2000, 17 American Sailors were killed and 29 wounded in a suicide bombing of the USS Cole in Aden Harbor, Yemen (Alexander, 2001, p.viii).
- On September 11, 2001, over 3,000 people were killed at the New York World Trade Center and Pentagon by three hijacked American commercial airplanes (*Behind the Terror: Understanding the Enemy*, 2001, Film).

2. Al-Qaida Background

Al-Qaida was officially established in 1989 by Osama bin Laden as an offshoot of the *mekhtab al khidemat* (MAK), the Afghan *mujahadeen* (Freedom Fighters or Holy Warriors) “services office.” Other names for the group include al-Qaida, al Qaeda (The Base), al-Qadr (Night of Power), The International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders (“clearing house” and coordinating body for groups world-wide), Islamic Salvation Foundation, The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites, Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Shrines (Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia), and The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places. Currently, it has thousands of members and supporters located in over 55 countries (Alexander, 2001, p.1, 6).

3. Al-Qaida Leadership: Osama bin Laden

Al-Qaida’s leader, Osama bin Laden, was born in 1957 in Saudi Arabia and is the group’s primary funding source. He is also known as Usama bin Muhammad bin Laden, Usama bin Muhammad bin- ‘Awad bin Laden, Shaykh Usama bin Laden, Abu Abdullah, Mujahid Shaykh, Hajj, Abdul Hay, al Qaqa, the Director, the Supervisor, the Emir, the Prince, and the Contractor. In the early 1980s, he began to travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan to raise money for the *mujahadeen* cause against the Soviets. In 1984, he built a “guesthouse” for new recruits in Peshawar Pakistan. In 1986, he created his own training camps, separate from the MEK. In 1988, he compiled a database of people traveling through his guesthouse, camps, and Afghanistan. The idea was to be able to send messages to family members. The network he established became known as “al-Qaida” (“the base”). When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia for two years, though his network continued in

Pakistan. During that time, he touted the failures of the Saudi government and was finally forced to leave the country. He fled briefly to Pakistan, then to Afghanistan where he tried to mediate the Afghan civil war. After failing to work out a settlement between Afghan warring factions and several reported attempts on his life, bin Laden relocated to Sudan in late 1991 (Alexander, 2001, p.3-4).

Sudan's National Islamic Front (NIF) regime had a very strict Islamic ideology that appealed to bin Laden. The NIF solicited his help for construction of ports, airports, and highways. This gave bin Laden funding, put his followers to work, and created a front for Al-Qaida to transport weapons and personnel. During this time, bin Laden tried to unite Shiite Muslim organizations under Al-Qaida, had discussions with the government of Iran, and sent Al-Qaida members to the terrorist organization, Hezbollah training camps in Lebanon (Alexander, 2001, p.5).

While bin Laden was in Sudan, Saudi intelligence allegedly attempted to assassinate him. Failing this, the Saudi government froze his assets in 1993, withdrew his citizenship in 1994, and his family publicly denounced him. International pressure and an embargo forced Sudan to ask bin Laden to leave. He returned to Afghanistan in 1996 and set up training camps and recruiting centers with the blessings of the winners of the Afghan civil war, the Taliban. From there he prosecuted attacks against the U.S. including his most recent September 11, 2001 attack of the World Trade Center and Pentagon, which sparked a U.S. "war on terrorism." As a result, U.S. forces bombed Al-Qaida training camps and strongholds in Afghanistan and precipitated the overthrow of the Taliban regime by the end of 2001. At this writing, bin Laden is believed to be still on the loose (Alexander, 2001, p.5-6).

4. Ideology and Objectives

Al-Qaida has two main ideological goals. The first is the opposition to all nations and institutions not governed in concert with their extremist interpretation of Islam. The second is the unacceptability of American military presence in the Middle East, especially on the Arabian Peninsula. A key objective is to unite all Muslims by overthrowing any regime that has been

corrupted by Western influence (Alexander, 2001, p.2).

According to Alexander and Rueda, the following is a compilation of Al-Qaida decrees and statements that clearly express their intentions.

- In 1992, Al-Qaida declared a *fatwa* (religious decree) against the presence of American soldiers in Somalia.
- A 1995 letter to the King of Saudi Arabia called for guerilla attacks against the U.S.
- In 1996, Usama bin Laden emphasized the deaths of weaker men, women, and children throughout the Muslim world.
- In August 1996, Al-Qaida declared a *Jihad* (war) against America and the Saudi Arabian government.
- In 1997, bin Laden reiterated the above goals during an interview with CNN and then again in 1998 in an interview with ABC News.
- In February 1998, Al-Qaida endorsed a *fatwa* (religious ruling) for all Muslims to kill Americans, including civilians, worldwide.
- In May 1998, Al-Qaida called for a Jihad against the U.S. and its allies.
- In late May 1998, an Al-Qaida document, "The Nuclear Bomb of Islam," stated that Muslims needed to use the most force possible to attack the enemies of God, i.e., the U.S. Army.
- In 1999, Al-Qaida declared that all American males should be killed (Alexander, 2001, p.2 and Rueda, 2001, p.20).

5. Organizational Structure




Figure 3-1: Al-Qaida Organizational Chart

Al-Qaida has a clearly defined command structure. Osama bin Laden is the head of the organization with a governing or “consultation council” (*majlis al shura*) consisting of 31 members under him. The Consultation Council is responsible for discussing, considering, and approving policies and actions, which include the issuing of *fatwahs* and terrorist operations. Five committees report to the consultation council. The first committee is the military, which oversees, considers, and approves all military related issues. The business committee is second and oversees all financial matters and front businesses. A religious committee deliberates religious rulings. A media committee is responsible for printing Al-Qaida materials. The fifth is a travel office responsible for moving Al-Qaida members worldwide. Operational decision-

making is centralized, while tactical decision-making is decentralized and fairly autonomous. Al-Qaida has cells in approximately 55 countries and nine main hubs, which are located in the U.S., the United Kingdom, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Lebanon, Algeria, and the Philippines. With the overthrow of the Taliban and the U.S.-led coalition forces in country, it is questionable if Afghanistan is still a main hub for Al-Qaida (Alexander, 2001, p.3 and Rueda p.29, 31-32).

6. Phases of an Al-Qaida Operation

According to Federal Bureau of Investigation transcripts, Al-Qaida separates its operations into four phases. The first phase is the collection of information about the time, place, type of target, and means to accomplish the mission. Phase two involves the consultation council. Based on the data, they decide whether or not the tactical mission meets the organization's overall objectives. Once the consultation council agrees to the mission, the third phase begins. This phase ensures that all logistical needs and operational requirements are in place to support the mission. Phase four is the gathering of cell members and actual attack of the target. Except for phase two, each cell is free to make its own tactical decisions to prepare for and accomplish the mission. As cells do not know about or communicate with other cells, operators most likely have no knowledge of coordinated or simultaneous attacks (Rueda, 2001, p.34).

7. Training and Military Equipment

Before the October 2001 War on Terrorism, Al-Qaida operated approximately 12 training camps in Afghanistan, which have reportedly trained over 5,000 members. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies alleges that "sleeper agents" may have been trained and now live around the world. As a result of the Soviet-Afghan War, Al-Qaida possesses SCUD-B missiles left behind by the Soviets and Stingers (heat-seeking ground-to-air anti-aircraft missiles) given to the Mujahideen by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency during the war (CNS, 2001, p.2).

D. AL-QAIDA TRAINING MANUAL

In 2000, an Al-Qaida member wrote a training manual for the group. We do not know his name, or his motivation other than his statement that he wanted to make a contribution to the cause (UK/BM-9 Translation). The title of the 180-page translated volume is, “Declaration of Jihad Against the Country’s Tyrants: Military Series.” It has a drawing of a globe showing the Middle East and Africa with a sword being thrust through it (UK/BM-2 Translation). The third page reiterates the idea that military force is needed to establish Islamic governments (UK/BM-3 Translation). Page four indicates that the book belongs to the “guest house” and should not be removed without permission (UK/BM-4 Translation). Could this be the guesthouse that Osama bin Laden built in 1984 in Peshawar Pakistan? Are there other “guest houses?” Or is it a term for a staging area for new recruits? Page five is a women’s pledge against the enemy (UK/BM-5 Translation). Al-Qaida only accepts male members, so a pledge to insulted and afflicted women is designed as a morale booster and further evidence of the justice of their cause. Pages 6-9 quote the Koran and describe the history of and reasons for the struggle (UK/BM-6-9 Translation). The book is then delineated into 18 lessons (chapters): 1) General Introduction, 2) Membership Qualifications, 3) Counterfeit Currency and Forged Documents, 4) Apartments – Hiding Places, 5) Means of Communication and Transportation, 6) Training, 7) Weapons – Buying and Transporting, 8) Member Safety, 9) Security Plan, 10) Special Tactical Operations, 11) Espionage – Open Methods, 12) Espionage – Covert Methods, 13) Secret Writing and Codes, 14) Kidnapping and Assassinations - Rifles and Pistols, 15) Kidnapping and Assassinations - Explosives, 16) Kidnapping and Assassinations – Poison and Cold Steel, 17) Interrogation and Investigation, and 18) Prisons and Detention Areas (UK/BM-10-180 Translation).

The following is a description of the content of each chapter. Chapter 1: General Introduction defines the Al-Qaida military organization, mission, and long-term and short-term goals. Chapter 2: Membership Qualifications states that an Al-Qaida recruit must meet 14 criteria. He must be a Muslim; committed to the organization’s ideology; mature; willing to sacrifice himself or members of his group for the organization; able to listen and obey; keep

secrets and conceal information; be healthy; patient; calm; intelligent; insightful; cautious; honest; have the ability to observe, analyze, act, conceal oneself, and change positions as necessary for safety (UK/BM-10-20 Translation).

Chapter 3: Counterfeit Currency and Forged Documents reviews financial security precautions. Chapter 4: Apartments – Hiding Places defines bases of operations and security precautions relating to apartments. Chapter 5: Means of Communication and Transportation includes open and secure means of communication e.g., telephone, meeting in person, messenger, letters, facsimile and wireless, and security measures for public and private transportation (UK/BM-21-42 Translation).

Chapter 6: Training includes training location specifications and trainees and trainer requirements. Chapter 7: Weapons – Buying and Transporting delineates four stages: 1) prior to purchase, 2) purchase, 3) transport, and 4) storage. Chapter 8: Member Safety defines safety and measures to be taken by an overt and covert member and the commander (UK/BM-43-55 Translation).

Chapter 9: Security Plan states the importance of a security plan, its required specifications, method of implementation, and examples of an individual and group security plans. It also reviews mobile versus stationary meeting locations, raids and capture of Al-Qaida members, and how to prepare for possible interrogation. Chapter 10: Special Tactical Operations reviews a definition of special operations, characteristics and weapons of members, importance and disadvantages of special operations, the tactical plan, its stages, and recommendations for commanders before and after operations (UK/BM-56-74 Translation).

Chapter 11: Espionage – Open Methods defines espionage, discusses how the Prophet Muhammad used espionage, guidelines for beating and killing hostages, the importance of open source information. Chapter 12: Espionage – Covert Methods covers information gathering security measures, how to perform and detect surveillance, intelligence, and observation, how to draw, photograph, and describe information, gathering information through interrogation and recruitment, candidates for recruitment, types of agents preferred by the U.S. Central

Intelligence Agency, stages of recruitment, and testing of the recruit. Chapter 13: Secret Writing and Codes reviews types of secret and invisible ink, how to produce invisible ink, types of ciphers and codes, and how to use them (UK/BM-75-115 Translation).

Chapter 14: Kidnapping and Assassinations - Rifles and Pistols delineates the characteristics and shortcomings of automatic pistols and revolvers, how to hold them, an introduction to rifles, principles and rules of aiming, critical parts of the human body, example of the assassination of a victim crossing a street, lessons learned, how to block a target's car for assassination, assassination at the entrance to a building, and the assassination of a target going to or from work. Chapter 15: Kidnapping and Assassinations – Explosives defines explosives, chain reaction, slow and fast fuses, detonating cord, blasting caps, connecting and connectors, booby traps, and electrical switches. Chapter 16: Kidnapping and Assassinations – Poison and Cold Steel discusses assassinations with knives, blunt objects, rope, hands, and poisons. Poisons include herbal and spoiled food (UK/BM-116-160 Translation).

Chapter 17: Interrogation and Investigation describes the differences between interrogation and questioning, techniques and steps of an interrogation, physical and psychological torture methods. And chapter 18: Prisons and Detention Areas reviews what a member must pay attention to in the event of an indictment and discusses the value of teamwork (UK/BM-161-180 Translation).

Before we conclude this section, let us review the potential audience for this document. Cordes states that terrorist writings have up to four audiences: 1) government, 2) the “oppressed” people, 3) members of like-minded groups, and 4) the terrorists themselves (Cordes, 1987, p.9). As this not a public document or communiqué, governments and “oppressed” people are not the audience. We know this because the first page states it is forbidden to remove the book from the house, except with permission (UK/BM-1, 4 Translation). In Al-Qaida's case, the manual acts as a guide for new recruits. This is assumed as the book is kept in a “guest house” and according to the literature, the “guest house” is a location through which all new Al-Qaida members pass (Alexander, 2001, p.3-4). Based on this assumption, this author believes that the manual is geared to increase Al-Qaida morale and

help members feel good about themselves. It justifies and glorifies their cause. It is possible that the manual was also written to be

shared with like-minded groups as Al-Qaida's goal is to expand itself and coordinate with other terrorist groups (Alexander, 2001, p.5).

E. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT

The first section of this chapter reviewed the religion of Islam, Muslim terminology and definitions, Islamic nationalism and literary revival, terrorist versus guerrilla tactics, the guerrilla movement in Afghanistan, terrorist groups that influenced Al-Qaida, Wahhabism, the rise of terrorist lethality, secular versus religious terrorism, and terrorism versus Islamic terrorism. Section two delineated the history of Al-Qaida attacks, Al-Qaida alias's, a profile of Osama bin Laden coupled with the development of the Al-Qaida group, Al-Qaida ideology and objectives, organizational structure, phases of an Al-Qaida operation, and training and military equipment. The final section reviewed the contents of the Al-Qaida training manual and its potential audience. Chapter four focuses on general hypotheses relating to Al-Qaida, an analysis of the Al-Qaida training manual based on the four frameworks model, a brief policy review of the group, and concludes with a review of current events and their relationship to elements found within the training manual.

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IV. RESULTS/ANALYSIS

*Usually, the main problem with life conundrums is that
we don't bring to them enough imagination.*

Thomas Moore, *Care of the Soul* (Bryson,
1995, p.3)

If you play with the fibers, they suggest possibilities.

Annie Albers, Weaver
(Bryson, 1995, p.130)

A. INTRODUCTION

In the 1987 Rand report, When Terrorists Do the Talking: Reflections on Terrorist Literature, Bonnie Cordes states that by reviewing documents written by terrorists, “much information about the terrorist mindset and decision making process can be gleaned” (Cordes, 1987, p.1). She adds that the written word oftentimes legitimizes, justifies, and rationalizes terrorist actions for themselves, revealing significant personal and organizational information. The recently appropriated Al-Qaida training manual is a prime document to review. As noted previously, this author analyzes the document in terms of the four frames model to suggest how Al-Qaida sees themselves, what they think they are doing, and what their actions will accomplish (Cordes, 1987, pp.1, 4).

This first section delineates several hypotheses gleaned from the manual in general. Section two begins the core analysis utilizing the four frameworks model and describes Al-Qaida's training structure, while reviewing rational versus irrational concepts and statements found within the training manual. The third section focuses on the human resources frame and investigates Al-Qaida's use of human resources and their perception of their members. The fourth section presents a look at Al-Qaida focusing on the symbolic frame through their use of stories, metaphor, and religion. The fifth section reviews Al-Qaida through the political frame and investigates their use of power and conflict to create and achieve goals. Section six delineates a review of Al-Qaida policy gleaned from statements made in their training manual.

Section seven reviews current events that support the supposition that Al-Qaida continue to use precepts from their training manual as a basis for their actions. The chapter concludes with a summary and assessment of the data.

B. GENERAL HYPOTHESES

Before delving into the elements of the structural frame, some basic textual hypotheses are presented. The first hypothesis is that the *document was most likely written during the Soviet Afghanistan war*. Several references support this hypothesis. The manual's author states in his history of the conflict that, "the young came to prepare themselves for Jihad commanded by the majestic Allah's order in the holy Koran" (UK/BM-8 Translation). This can be interpreted to mean that when the Soviets invaded, imams in Islamic countries put out a call for soldiers to help in Afghanistan. The text contains many references to Afghanistan, communists, and military responses. When discussing why a member must be a Muslim in order to be a member of Al-Qaida, the author references the requirement that a Soviet officer must be a member of the Communist party (UK/BM-15 Translation). In referencing the selection of hiding places, the author states, "The opposite was true in Afghanistan, where initially Jihad work was in the cities, then the warriors shifted to mountains and harsh terrain. There, they started battling the Communists" (UK/BM-25 Translation). Further, when discussing technical abilities i.e., facsimile and wireless, the author states, "Considering its modest capabilities and the pursuit by the security apparatus of its members and forces, the Islamic Military Organization cannot obtain these devices" (UK/BM-38 Translation). When discussing the transportation of weapons, the author warns, "Avoid main roads where check points are common" (UK/BM-48 Translation). This likely refers to Afghanistan under Soviet occupation. Additionally, the author states, "It is necessary for any party that adopts Jihad work and has many members to subdivide its members into three groups..." (UK/BM-2 Translation). This could be referring to the thousands of freedom fighters that came to Afghanistan in large groups from many different countries during the war. The author also referred to rubbing lead powder into paper to see previously written words

(UK/BM-2 Translation). This demonstrates the relatively primitive conditions in which the organization's members lived.

A second hypothesis is that the translation of the title of the manual, Declaration of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants: Military Series, indicates that this *manual may be one of many types of training manuals* that Al-Qaida use. The manual is basic in nature and does not expound on "camp" training, i.e., physical fitness, tactics, and shooting (UK/BM-2, 44 Translation). While this manual is a type of training, it focuses primarily on personnel and procedural security. Chapters that delineate practical training include how to fire a revolver, how to make invisible ink, how to write in codes and ciphers, how and when to use simple types of explosives, and how to make basic poisons.

The third hypothesis is that the *manual was written for a particular regional setting*, specifically Afghanistan, as it references tribal relations, fighting and hiding in mountainous terrain, an example of a security plan for an individual training in Afghanistan, and questions asked by Pakistani and Afghan officials when entering and leaving these countries (UK/BM-25, 58-59, 94 Translation).

Whether the manual was mass-produced and distributed to many locations is unknown based on the text. However, a fourth hypothesis posits that most likely the *author initially wrote the manual for the guest house in Peshawar, Pakistan and the intended audience were newly arrived freedom fighters during the Soviet Afghanistan War*. This is hypothesized from information in other texts that state that Osama bin Laden built a "guest house" in Peshawar, Pakistan as a staging area for new recruits for the holy war in Afghanistan. Also, the author states the manual is intended for the "pure, Muslim youth, the believer, the mujahid (fighter) for God's sake. This can be construed to mean new recruits (UK/BM-4, 176-180 Translation). The language is simple and basic enough to be understood by someone who has no previous knowledge of how to conduct operations.

The fifth hypothesis posits that the *author is an older man*, possibly a member of the consultation council or one of the committees, or perhaps the military committee as he has

extensive knowledge of military operations and weapons. Also, he writes, “I present this humble effort to these young Moslem men who are pure, believing, and fighting for the cause of Allah. It is my contribution toward paving the road that leads to majestic Allah and establishes a caliphate according to the prophecy” (UK/BM-9 Translation).

Finally, hypothesis six states that the *author is educated and well-versed in history* as he quotes events from Roman, Islamic, Soviet, British, and American literature. He utilizes footnotes and references (UK/BM-11, 15, 17-19, 65, 76-79, 117, 132, 172 Translation).

During the production of this manual, the author recommends shifts in organizational structure to cells or cluster methods. He states, the organization “should be composed of many cells whose members do not know one another, so that if a cell member is caught the other cells would not be affected, and work would proceed normally” (UK/BM-30 Translation). This author hypothesizes that this has in fact happened and Al-Qaida have shifted to a network structure, though it happened after the production of this manual and is therefore, not reflected in the document.

C. AL-QAIDA – STRUCTURAL FRAME

The Al-Qaida training manual is primarily a structure-oriented document. While it contains aspects described in the human resources, symbolic, and political frames, the manual delineates extensive lists and step-by-step procedures for accomplishing a variety of tasks, e.g., how to choose a hiding place, how to coordinate overt meetings, how to fire a revolver, how to make herbal poisons, etc. Step one in the analysis is to review the structural elements present in the training manual and step two is to determine how and if Al-Qaida fit into this frame’s basic assumptions as delineated by Bolman and Deal (Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.35-262).

1. Training Manual Elements

Even before reading the Al-Qaida training manual, one notes the presence of structure in its format. It contains a very distinct beginning, middle, and end and is divided into eighteen chapters, each focusing on one aspect of terrorist training. The title identifies it as a part of a “military series,” leading one to assume it is one training manual of many.

The first page sets the stage by illuminating the Al-Qaida philosophy, “Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they always have been by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth” (UK/BM-3 Translation). This begins the structural paradox of rational versus irrational that is seen throughout the text. The author states that Al-Qaida are aware that they are not rational in terms of Socrates, Aristotle, or Plato as they chose to prosecute their will through violent means (UK/BM-3 Translation). More examples of the rationality paradox are seen in the selection of verses quoted from the Koran. The first states, “be heedful of the wombs [that bore you]: for Allah ever watches over you” (UK/BM-6 Translation). This seems to indicate that women are held in esteem and should not be harmed. However, how many women were killed in Tanzania, Kenya, and New York in Al-Qaida attacks? This indicates that the manual was written before these attacks and the shift in Al-Qaida policy, which currently allows it to kill indiscriminately. If so, it demonstrates that there was in fact a shift in policy to a more violent focus. Another Koranic verse states, “the worst thing is to introduce something new, for every novelty is an act of heresy and each heresy is a deception” (UK/BM-6 Translation). As previously noted, Al-Qaida policies have shifted. So can that be construed as heresy? Does that mean the current practices of Al-Qaida are not in line with their original objectives? Are they therefore deceiving their members?

The author refers to Islam as a “complete system.” This structure includes, “religion and government, worship and Jihad, ethics and dealing with people, and the Koran and sword” (UK/BM-8 Translation). It is a straightforward structure and appears rational. The author offers the need to unite the ranks and adherence to religion as the underpinnings to Al-Qaida’s development and success (UK/BM-11 Translation). He further states that a leader is necessary because it was mandated by the Prophet Muhammad, “If three [people] come together let them pick a leader” (UK/BM-11 Translation). Next, the author states that since God “obligated us to do good and avoid the unlawful,” (UK/BM-11 Translation) a group needs to use force and have a leader. Again the rational/irrational structure materializes. Organizationally, a strong leader will enhance the organization, but the author continues to refer to the use of force as a

means to an end. It is difficult to see the rationality between doing good and avoiding the unlawful and the use of force. Of course, this may be a Western failing.

The first chapter or “lesson” is the epitome of structure. It states the three principles of an organization: 1) the need for a commander and advisory council, 2) members [soldiers], and 3) a clearly defined strategy. Requirements include: 1) forged documents and counterfeit currency, 2) apartments and hiding places, 3) communications means, 4) transportation means, 5) information, 6) arms and ammunition, and 7) transport. The main mission is “the overthrow of the godless regimes and their replacement with the Islamic regime” (UK/BM-12 Translation).

Secondary missions include:

- 1) Gathering information about the enemy, the land, the installations, and the neighbors.
- 2) Kidnapping enemy personnel, documents, secrets, and arms.
- 3) Assassinating enemy personnel as well as foreign tourists.
- 4) Freeing the brothers who are captured by the enemy.
- 5) Spreading rumors and writing statements that instigate people against the enemy.
- 6) Blasting and destroying the places of amusement, immorality, and sin; not a vital target.
- 7) Blasting and destroying the embassies and attacking vital economic centers.
- 8) Blasting and destroying bridges leading into and out of the cities (UK/BM-12 Translation).

Again, the author demonstrates superbly delineated structure, but are these missions rational? The author concludes this chapter with specific structural goals: tasks must be performed with precision, work must be controlled and not deviated from or fragmented, and delineated long and short term goals must be achieved (UK/BM-12 Translation).

Chapter two explains the 14 criteria necessary to become a member of Al-Qaida. These criteria are extremely sophisticated and very similar to Western military recruitment criteria. Structurally speaking, they do not accept recruits under the age of 15 and most of the ideas are rational. However, when Al-Qaida talk about the criteria of “sacrifice,” they do not

mean giving up hot meals or leaving their families for long periods of time. They are specifically referring to the ability of a member to die for the cause. Commitment and ability to act is the ability to kill your comrade or your whole group if necessary. So the concept of rationality is again called into question (UK/BM-15-20 Translation).

Chapter three delineates financial security precautions: 1) divide operational funds into two parts, investments and expenditures, 2) do not put all funds in one place, 3) do not tell the members where the funds are, 4) provide protection for funds while in transit, and 5) leave money with non-members and only spend what one needs (UK/BM-22 Translation). The following is a list of Al-Qaida personnel safety precautions that are seen repeated throughout the text. Passports should be kept in a safe place, know the information in the passport, all personal documents should be falsified, shave beards if working outside the country, ensure document pictures do not contain beards, do not add wives to the passport, do not go to the country of the passport, and fit in with the populace wherever you go. These are very specific rules and regulations and are in keeping with a procedure-driven organization (UK/BM-22-23 Translation). The author states, “All falsification matters should be carried out through the command and not haphazardly (procedure control)” (UK/BM-23 Translation). This indicates a central control body such as the travel committee as well as a specific chain of command.

Chapter four defines apartments as hiding places within urban areas; bases are hideouts in harsh terrain or outside populated areas. The manual delineates 22 safety precautions relating to apartments. Some include choosing the ground floor for ease of escape, moving into newer developments, not living near police or government buildings, fit in, but keep a low profile, replacing locks, and establishing a prearranged signal for safe entry (UK/BM-26-27 Translation). All are structurally rational.

In chapter five, communication is categorized in three parts: common, standby, and alarm. A hierarchy of authority is noticed when the author states that the higher-ranking commander determines the type and method of communication for the lower echelons (UK/BM-30 Translation). The rest of the chapter specifies procedures for the use of the telephone, meeting in-person, messenger, letters, and facsimile and wireless. When discussing

transportation, Al-Qaida distinguish between public and private means, each with their own security precautions. Most important for both are the strictures to adhere to traffic rules and having proper identification documents. Again, the procedures are clear, concise, very rational, and logical (UK/BM-29-42 Translation).

The chapter on training is only two pages and delineates security procedures for choosing a training location, trainees, and trainers. Structurally, the place should be suitable for the type of training needed. Trainees should not know each other or the identity of the trainers. Class size should be between seven and ten members with a small ratio of trainees to trainers (UK/BM-44-45 Translation). This section is short because the manual is assumed to be a basic training manual for new Al-Qaida recruits and, as such, does not give a detailed account of follow-on physical training. This author posits that there are many other Al-Qaida training manuals that specifically refer to physical training.

Chapter seven requires the creation of a “careful, systematic, and firm security plan” for the buying, transport, and storage of weapons (UK/BM-47 Translation). The plan should have four stages: prior to purchase, purchase, transport, and storage. Again, procedural safety is emphasized: appearance should be appropriate to the purchase place, know the area, use secondary roads, detect surveillance, verify weapons work, do not linger during a purchase, do not pay until receiving the weapons, drive the vehicle normally when transporting weapons, store weapons in a safe place, keep an inventory, and only the commander and arsenal keeper should know where the weapons are stored (UK/BM-47-50 Translation). Having a plan for each stage demonstrates forethought and rational thinking.

Chapter eight is a lesson in member safety and reveals the existence of three types of Al-Qaida members: overt, covert, and commander. Each has specific restrictions. The overt member is told not to be inquisitive or talkative and not to carry information regarding the group. The covert member must blend in, have a false identity, avoid Islamic places and expressions, and not attract attention. The commander is considered more important than the first two members because of the possession of information and the difficulty in replacement (UK/BM-52-55 Translation). Based on these restrictions, this author believes that an Al-Qaida terrorist

on a mission will not look or act like a Muslim. A regular, “overt” member will have a Muslim appearance, but lack information pertaining to terrorist operations.

Chapter nine details the security plan and defines it as “a set of coordinated, cohesive, and integrated measures that are related to a certain activity and designed to confuse and surprise the enemy, and if uncovered, to minimize the work loss as much as possible” (UK/BM-57 Translation). Al-Qaida believe that the more solid the plan, the more successful the work and fewer losses. Six conditions must be met for the plan to be successful: 1) realistic, based on fact, 2) coordinated and cohesive, 3) simple, 4) creative, 5) flexible, and 6) secret. The rest of the chapter delineates examples of security plans for individuals and groups, and what to do if captured and interrogated (UK/BM-57-67 Translation).

The tenth chapter deals with special tactical operations, specifically defining them, listing individual characteristics necessary to perform the tasks, types of weapons used, the importance and disadvantages of special operations, the stages of a special operations tactical plan, and how to write one. A footnote in the training manual refers the reader to “review in detail the notebook: Lessons in Special Operations,” indicating again that there is more than one type of Al-Qaida training manual (UK/BM-69 Translation). The tactical plan has three stages: 1) research, 2) planning, and 3) execution. In the research stage, precise information is collected about the target. The manual presents a checklist of information to obtain. Similarly in the planning and execution stages, specific checklists are available for the commander’s consideration as he creates, implements, and evaluates the tactical plan (UK/BM-71-74 Translation).

In chapter eleven, the author discusses the concept of open-source espionage and how it falls in line with Islamic teachings. He refers the reader to The Spying Journal: Religious Duty and Human Necessity, which this author believes may be another Al-Qaida training manual.

Four reasons are given to collect information:

- 1) If the group has good information on the enemy’s capabilities and plans, Al-Qaida can design good-quality and secure plans.

- 2) Information about the enemy’s intention provides early warning signs for the

command, which in turn makes appropriate preparation and thwarts the enemy's opportunity.

3) Information benefits the Organization's command by providing information about the enemy's strengths and weaknesses.

4) Information benefits the Organization's command by providing information about movements of the enemy and his members (UK/BM-79-80 Translation).

The manual distinguishes between public sources, where 80 percent of the information is obtained and secret sources, where the other 20 percent is obtained. Public sources include: newspaper, magazines, and official and party publications. Secret sources are recruited individuals, recording and monitoring, photography, interrogation, documents, drugging, surveillance, spying, and observation (UK/BM-80-83 Translation).

Chapter twelve discusses security measures necessary for information gatherers. Al-Qaida prohibit the carrying of a weapon during this process. The manual teaches the reader how to conduct surveillance on foot, in a car, and specifies how to draw and describe a target or location (UK/BM-87-91 Translation). The rest of the chapter is devoted to gathering information through covert means such as interrogation and recruitment. The recruitment section is particularly detailed, explaining how to find, evaluate, and approach candidates who may be coerced into working for Al-Qaida without becoming a member, i.e., secret agents. Al-Qaida acknowledge this is the most difficult and dangerous task within their organization. As such, the manual admits that specially trained members do this work. However, the manual gives no detail on this type of training (UK/BM-91-98 Translation). It is interesting to note that the manual has a section about the types of agents preferred by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which indicates the manual was written during the Soviet Afghanistan War or information obtained during that period was passed on to Al-Qaida (UK/BM-93 Translation). Open-source documents confirm the presence of the CIA in the war and their assistance to the mujahideen, precursors of Al-Qaida (Behind the Terror: Understanding the Enemy, 2001, Film). As the Al-Qaida training manual section on recruitment of secret agents is so sophisticated, one wonders if the author had access to CIA training documents specifically

referring to espionage.

Chapter thirteen is the second largest in the manual and deals with secret writing, types of invisible ink, codes, and ciphers. Great attention is devoted to the demonstration message writing in code and ciphers (UK/BM-100-115 Translation). This reinforces the requirement for secrecy in all things, and if this manual is in fact intended for new recruits, this is one of the first things they learn. This chapter is strictly structural, rational, and has no elements of the other three frames. It is a compilation of lists and examples of how to write code.

Chapter fourteen is the largest chapter in the manual. It is also very practical and rational in nature. It begins with the characteristics and shortcomings of the automatic pistol and revolver. It describes hand positions in detail utilizing words and diagrams. As it turns to rifles, the author refers to the “Kalashnikov lesson,” which could be another training manual regarding rifles. This could also indicate that the manual was written during the Soviet Afghanistan War when Al-Qaida members were still using Soviet made weapons provided by the U.S. However, it is also possible that Al-Qaida currently continues to use Kalashnikov rifles during their training process due to availability of that type of weapon in Afghanistan. It is interesting to note that Al-Qaida members are allowed to use whichever hand they prefer for firing a weapon. The author then delineates critical body parts to aim for to kill a person and what he calls, “elementary” assassination operations including: 1) a target crossing the street, 2) blocking a target’s car, 3) a target at the entrance of a building, and 4) a target going to and from work. The author provides examples of each type of assassination and an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each (UK/BM-117-138 Translation).

Chapter fifteen focuses on assassinations with explosives. Al-Qaida prefer this method, as they consider it the safest. Members can get away, no evidence is left at the scene, and it terrorizes and frightens the enemy. The chapter defines explosives, methods and characteristics of detonation, and connecting and connectors. It is a highly technical, sophisticated chapter that utilizes diagrams and lists to convey meaning. Specific items discussed are slow and fast fuses, detonating cord, blasting caps, booby traps, and electrical switches. Examples of assassinations with explosives are presented (UK/BM-140-152 Translation).

Chapter sixteen reviews assassination using poisons and cold steel. The first section focuses on the areas of the body that can be lethally accessed with knives, blunt objects, rope, and hands. The rest of the chapter is devoted to how to make simple herbal and chemical poisons and what the resulting symptoms will be (UK/BM-154-160 Translation).

In chapter seventeen, the author explains the difference between interrogation and questioning, describes steps to be taken by members if they are in either situation, what to do or not to do during torture, the stages and methods of physical and psychological torture, and a compilation of interrogation and questioning experiences from the memoirs of an Iranian Communist. The chapter is very specific and based on group members' experiences. The author states the examples are numerous and torture is going on all the time (UK/BM-162-175 Translation).

Chapter eighteen teaches the member how to act in prison and detention centers and lists the importance of teamwork. He ends his manual with a dedication to the Muslim fighter and the statement from the Prophet Mohammad that states that ultimately God will decide what happens in the country, in the government, and in the group. If God wills it, Al-Qaida will succeed; if he does not, then Al-Qaida will fail (UK/BM-176-180 Translation).

2. Frame Applications

As noted in chapter two of this thesis, Bolman and Deal stated the existence of six structural assumptions (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.40). The first is that organizations exist to achieve established goals and objectives (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.40). As demonstrated previously, Al-Qaida have very specific goals and are in the process of implementing strategy delineated in the training manual to achieve them, i.e., bombings, assassinations, etc., (UK/BM-12 Translation).

The second assumption is that organizations function best when rationality prevails over personal preferences and external pressures. The training manual is a very rational document in terms of its structure and follows a logical course when listing requirements and procedures. Though external circumstances such as torture of Al-Qaida members and the perceived eradication of the Muslim identity affects Al-Qaida, they have continued to follow the doctrine

laid out in their training manual (UK/BM-7 Translation).

The third assumption states that structures must be designed to fit an organization's circumstances. Al-Qaida have created a simple, yet formalized structure with a specifically delineated chain of command that incorporates ideology and religion with sophisticated military procedures and training (UK/BM-1-180 Translation).

Assumption four states that organizations enhance performance and increase efficiency through specialization and division of labor. Al-Qaida have achieved this by creating special operations and recruiting groups. Additionally, each cell is divided into a commander, an overt member, and a covert member. And finally, members are chosen for specific tasks based on their abilities (UK/BM-52-55, 69-74, 91-98 Translation).

As demonstrated in the training manual, Al-Qaida have many different types of people working for the group. The nature of the task determines the nature of the workforce. Special tactical operations cells and those recruiting special agents to the cause require sophistication and specialized training. As a result, greater autonomy and discretion are sought and generally given to accomplish tasks and operations. While it is true that ideas for missions need to be approved through the chain of command, each cell

is autonomous and encouraged to create its own security as well as tactical plans (UK/BM-57-67, 71-74 Translation).

The fifth assumption states that organizations need appropriate forms of control and coordination to ensure individuals and units work together to obtain an organization's goals (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.40). The manual does not refer to specific forms of control and coordination, other than the requirement for a common ideology and members meeting the same criteria when being recruited (UK/BM-15-20 Translation).

The author touches on assumption six, problems and gaps in performance due to structural deficiencies can be fixed through restructuring, when he speaks about the need for a structural shift to cell or cluster methods to facilitate operations and protect members (UK/BM-30 Translation).

Based on open-source reporting, Al-Qaida utilize both vertical and lateral coordination (Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.42-47). However, in the training manual, only vertical coordination is referred to (UK/BM-22-23, 30, 52-55, 71-74 Translation). This supports the conclusion that the manual is outdated and there have been structural shifts within Al-Qaida over the years.

In a review of the structural imperatives, we find that Al-Qaida are a large and growing organization, which have existed since 1986. They have cells in over 55 countries and are becoming more sophisticated as time progresses. The training manual does not refer to the characteristic of size and age.

Al-Qaida core processes align with their structure. They have specific goals and create appropriate policies and programs to implement. This follows the “rational” planning model for decision making referred to by John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations. Bryson states that the “rational” planning model “represents a rational-deductive approach to decision making. It begins with goals; policies, programs, and actions are then deduced to achieve those goals” (Bryson, 1997, p.11). A fundamental assumption is that in fragmented, shared-power settings, someone with enough power and authority will exist to fill the vacuum so that consensus does not matter (Bryson, 1997, p.11). Osama bin Laden fills that position within Al-Qaida. An example of Al-Qaida’s use of this model, whether knowingly or otherwise, is as follows. One of Al-Qaida’s goals was to attract attention of their cause. The training manual set forth a policy to attack vital economic centers (UK/BM-12 Translation). Al-Qaida created the special operations program to implement these types of attacks (UK/BM-69-74 Translation). One of the resulting actions was the bombing of the World Trade Center in 2001.

Al-Qaida’s environment, by its nature, is uncertain and turbulent. As a result, their structure is more complex and adaptable. This author believes that the training manual only scratches the surface to understanding the detail within the organization.

Strategy and goals seem to be changing within the organization as evidenced by a comparison of the training manual to current events. As Al-Qaida become structurally more

complex and sophisticated, their organization is expanding resulting in an increase in power (CNS, 2001, p.2). This may be the reason Al-Qaida have increased the violence of their attacks and now focus on indiscriminant killing of non-combatants.

Information technology is a critical structural imperative and one that is not referenced in the training manual, except to say acquiring technology is very difficult (UK/BM-12 Translation). The training manual defines technology as telephones, facsimiles, and wirelasses, which leads this author to conclude that the text is old as open-source reporting indicates Al-Qaida are technologically very sophisticated and utilize the Internet for secret communications between terrorist cells (Behind the Terror: Understanding the Enemy, 2001, Film).

Now that the general structural characteristics have been defined, we turn to the review of structural dilemmas or trade-offs found within the group. Al-Qaida do not have a dilemma of differentiation versus integration. While the organization is very differentiated, they are all working toward the same goals. Their ideology is the glue that focuses their efforts. This group has achieved a balance between the two extremes.

The training manual does not specifically address the gaps versus overlaps dilemma. Responsibilities within Al-Qaida are clearly defined, however, the presence of a multitude of semi-autonomous cells in 55 different countries inevitably creates redundancies and wasted effort that may cause conflict within the ranks. This assumption of conflict cannot be gleaned from the training manual. Alternatively, important jobs may go undone as one cell assumes a related task is being performed by another section. Close coordination by the commanders of each cell is required to balance this particular dilemma. According to the training manual, this coordination is mandatory. What we do not know is if it actually works.

It is possible that Al-Qaida members in the “overt” arena may feel underutilized; but this is purely speculation as the manual is written from an Al-Qaida leadership perspective and any mission is sanctioned by Allah, and therefore good. It does seem that the author of the manual regrets the fact that he was older or not able to participate in the military aspect of the cause. Does this mean he feels bored? Probably not, as conditions within Afghanistan and Al-Qaida create Maslow’s need for survival and safety, which negates the time for feeling bored (as cited

in Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.104-105). Of course, as with any paramilitary group, the idea of “hurry up and wait” is most likely a factor of Al-Qaida existence. They may be ready, but must wait for the right moment to attack. This may cause feelings of underutilization. Again this is speculation and not supported in the manual. Future research should consist of interviews of Al-Qaida members about these issues.

The reverse of the underuse-versus-overload dilemma is overload (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.60). One may presume, based on the rigors, requirements, and intensity indicated in the training manual, that Al-Qaida members are often overworked, making them edgy, tense, and burnt out. Living a life on the edge, without a home, family, or country takes a huge psychological toll on the members and the leadership. This is another area in which analysts should focus future study.

In the lack of clarity versus lack of creativity dilemma, Al-Qaida tend toward strict, well-defined roles (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.60). Miscommunication is possible, but according to the training manual, some creativity in the creation and implementation of operational plans is allowed. The question is then how much creativity is allowed, and

is it sufficient to give members a sense of ownership, thereby increasing their productivity? This is a question that can only be answered by members of Al-Qaida.

Excessive autonomy versus excessive interdependence does not appear to be a dilemma for Al-Qaida, as they seem to have found a balance as in the gaps versus overlaps dilemma (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.61). It is unknown how the member feels about “isolation,” if he perceives non-support from the group, or if commanders feel “frustration” for time wasted for what they may feel is unnecessary coordination, if roles are too tightly linked or interdependent. The training manual makes it quite clear that rules exist, but each cell is granted a level of autonomy that seems to be sufficient. As the manual is written from a leadership perspective, it would be interesting to discover how the Al-Qaida member feels about these assumptions.

The too-loose-versus-too-tight dilemma states that if a structure is too loose, people

lose their way and have little sense of what others are doing in the organization. If the structure is too tight, flexibility is stifled and causes members to spend too much time trying to circumvent the system (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.61). This author does not believe Al-Qaida would allow its members to circumvent the system, as the leadership is very autocratic. However, according to the training manual, they seem to acknowledge the abilities of some of their members and allow a measure of flexibility. This implies that the Al-Qaida organization is not too tight. It is possible since the cells are very diffused throughout the world and have little contact with each other that the system may be in this sense, “too loose.” Strict rules and ideology maintain a clear direction for the members and help alleviate the structural problem of looseness, but the problem most likely remains. However, this author believes that subsequent to the writing of the training manual and according to open source reporting, Al-Qaida have allegedly implemented the use of sophisticated Internet communications between cells (Behind the Terror: Understanding the Enemy, 2001, Film). This may have been an attempt to modernize or react to the structural problem of looseness within the organization. This demonstrates Al-Qaida sophistication and savvy, but further discussion of this new Al-Qaida trend is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Al-Qaida do not have a dilemma of diffuse authority versus overcentralization (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.61). Members clearly understand who has control over what and though the structure has some levels of authority, they are minimal as the structure is relatively flat. Based on the training manual, members are not confused, they utilize initiative, and decision-making is not sluggish or clumsy because of too many layers.

According to the training manual, Al-Qaida may be a more goalbound organization (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.61) as their goals are well defined and deviation is not allowed. It would be interesting to trace the evolution of Al-Qaida goals and objectives from the Soviet Afghanistan War, time in Sudan, time in Afghanistan under the Taliban, and currently as they are being attacked to see how and if they have deviated. It seems to this author, that Al-Qaida has maintained their course and are clinging to their goals even after they may be obsolete.

Finally, the irresponsive-versus-unresponsive dilemma considers that when members relinquish their responsibilities or adhere too rigidly to regulations, performance suffers. Similarly, turning down every request alienates the members (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.61). The training manual does not delineate how Al-Qaida central command responds to plans devised by their cells. As such, this author cannot make a distinction between the alienation of members who feel the organization is ignoring them and members who do not pursue their objectives sufficiently or are too fanatical in their adherence to Al-Qaida policy. This is another area ripe for further research.

D. AL-QAIDA – HUMAN RESOURCES FRAME

As noted in chapter two, the Human Resources Frame is based on elements and theories gleaned from psychology. While the Al-Qaida training manual is a straightforward delineation of structures, lists, and procedures, elements of human resources are readily apparent in the content. The next section defines and analyzes these elements.

1. Training Manual Elements

One may not think of a terrorist group as having human resources elements, but by virtue of the fact that it is an organization, human resources elements do exist. The manual begins with a pledge to women, indicating that Al-Qaida is concerned about the mistreatment of Muslim women. This implies sentiment for fellow Muslims and excludes them from targeting. The first half of the pledge reviews insults done to women; the second half pledges, “to make them [the enemy] desire death and hate appointments and prestige...to slaughter them like lambs and let the Nile, al-Asi, and Euphrates rivers flow with their blood....” (UK/BM-5 Translation). Al-Qaida’s goal is to retaliate against previous insults to Muslim women. The pledge also specifically states that Al-Qaida want to make the women and children of the enemy, widows and orphans, not kill them. This is another indication that the manual is older than 1993 and a shift in their goals and objectives has taken place. Recall that Al-Qaida first targeted the World Trade Center in 1993, harming women (UK/BM-5 Translation).

The next instance of a human resources element is found in the author’s selection of

Koranic phrases. He chooses a passage, which states, “Thanks be to Allah. We thank him, turn to him, ask his forgiveness, and seek refuge in him from our wicked souls and bad deeds” (UK/BM-6 Translation). This indicates the assumption that people are inherently bad. Another cited verse states, “O ye who believe! Fear Allah as He should be feared, and die not except in the state of Islam” (UK/BM-6 Translation). This being said, if Al-Qaida represent themselves as the true representative of Islam, then dying for the cause is acceptable. The final verse states, “Fear Allah, and make your utterance straightforward: That he may make your conduct whole and sound and forgive you your sins. He that obeys Allah and his messenger, has already attained the great victory” (UK/BM-6 Translation). Al-Qaida seem to be implying that if one follows the rules, one’s sins are forgiven and one will be victorious. This may also refer to Osama bin Laden’s status as leader of Al-Qaida. If one follows bin Laden, they are doing the will of Allah.

In chapter one the author quotes Sheik Ibn Taimia who states, “The interests of all Adam’s children would not be realized in the present life, nor in the next, except through assembly, cooperation, and mutual assistance” (UK/BM-6 Translation). Assembly, cooperation, and mutual assistance are three human resources precepts that are integrated into Al-Qaida philosophy. While not specifically delineated in the manual, Al-Qaida have created a consultation council and five committees to discuss issues and operations in a group setting or assembly (Alexander, 2001, p.5). Though committees are a structural element, the human resources application is demonstrated in the positive, cooperative, and open interaction and communication between members. The organization believes that cooperation is essential for achieving their goals. Whether this is internal or external cooperation, the manual does not say. It is most likely both, as Al-Qaida have strict internal controls and methods of dialogue and externally has interfaced with a variety of terrorist groups and state sponsors to achieve their ends and cross train (Alexander, 2001, p.5).

When discussing the reasons for the importance of the Military Organization (Al-Qaida), the author focuses on discipline, the proper utilization of a member according to his

abilities (job matching), and the use of collective views on all aspects of a job (UK/BM-13 Translation). This is a very sophisticated use of the human resources frame. One of the main problems an organization faces is the poor match of an employee to a job based on his abilities (Muchinsky, 2000, pp.400-402). The manual clearly states that Al-Qaida select individuals for specific tasks based on their abilities, especially when choosing a team for a covert operation (UK/BM-65, 73 Translation). Part of the process requires that the members selected for the mission do not know each other or the planners of the operation (UK/BM-65 Translation). This maintains organizational security and protects members from reprisals if another member is captured and confesses.

Al-Qaida are very sensitive to the consequences of choosing a particular member for a mission. If the member's absence from home or work causes questions or attracts attention, the member will not go on that mission (UK/BM-66 Translation).

Upon selection, the member must memorize the plan and be able to repeat it back to the commander during individual training sessions. Part of the plan includes what to do and say during an interrogation and investigation (UK/BM-66 Translation). Al-Qaida's goal is to show a coordinated front and deceive the enemy about the operation. This protects the group and enhances Al-Qaida's perceived power.

Ideology is a critical part of Al-Qaida's structure. Looking at it from a human resources perspective, one notices that Al-Qaida rely on it to "keep things simple" [author's emphasis] in the organization. If a member follows the ideology, no thinking is necessary or as the training manual author states, commitment to ideology frees "members from conceptual problems" (UK/BM-15 Translation). This organization is delineated by the top leadership doing the thinking and the members doing the reacting. Kim states that this type of structure is on the first or lowest level of understanding, and by definition, is the most reactive and therefore, inefficient structure (Kim, 1993, p.1).

The author states that the job of an Al-Qaida member is hard, dangerous, and requires psychological, mental, intellectual ability (UK/BM-15 Translation). This indicates that the workforce is very sophisticated and specially selected based on strict criteria. Additionally, a

member is expected to work hard for the cause, and if necessary, become a martyr (UK/BM-15 Translation).

The concept of strict discipline is reiterated through the Koranic verse, “Obey Allah and obey the messenger and those charged with authority among you” (UK/BM-15 Translation). This takes the idea of following the precepts of an organization to a whole new level. It now becomes a sin to disobey one’s superiors in the group. This outlook allows for vast control of the leadership over its members.

When discussing the requirement to listen and obey, the author quotes the Prophet Muhammad, “Go get me information about those people and do not alarm them about me” (UK/BM-16 Translation). This indicates that secret data collection is critical. This stricture prohibits Al-Qaida members from conducting unapproved, spontaneous, and unplanned attacks and reasserts the tight control the leadership has on its members.

When the author reviews the concept of secrecy, he again quotes from the Prophet Muhammad, “Seek Allah’s help in doing your affairs in secrecy” (UK/BM-16 Translation). He further expounds that secrecy equates to “faithfulness” and argues that since the Prophet Muhammad kept work secrets from his wife, so should Al-Qaida members (UK/BM-16 Translation).

Other requirements for Al-Qaida recruitment are health, patience, and unflappability. The member must be patient to bear all the inevitable upcoming hardships and unflappable in case of “bloodshed, murder, arrest, imprisonment,” torture, and the possibility of having to kill one’s comrades (UK/BM-16 Translation).

Another necessary characteristic for an Al-Qaida member is adaptability. One must be able to blend in one’s surroundings and not be the focus of attention (UK/BM-22 Translation). A member must be able to suspend his strong religious convictions in cases where they would be inappropriate and detrimental to a mission (UK/BM-40 Translation). This necessitates specific training, which the manual does not discuss. Another good topic for future research is to discover how an Al-Qaida member is taught to suspend his religious convictions during a mission.

In chapter five, the manual speaks of a specific chain of command when referring to the determination of the type and method of communication between commanders (UK/BM-30 Translation). While this is a structural detail, a human resources element is that Al-Qaida expect compliance by their members. During a discussion of telephone communication, the author explains why Al-Qaida conduct a particular procedure (UK/BM-30 Translation). This indicates that Al-Qaida have a goal of giving the members an opportunity to understand and not just memorize procedures. As noted previously, Al-Qaida are a strict organization, but they do make an attempt to incorporate the members into the “big picture.” They therefore acknowledge that their members are intelligent and as such, deserve to know “what is going on.” This is very good for the overall organization as it makes workers feel wanted and cared about, and ultimately results in increased morale and productivity.

It is interesting to note, that while Al-Qaida acknowledge the sophistication and intelligence of its members, the author writes procedures in very basic terms, indicating that the members are not intelligent and have no common sense. For example in chapter five, the author warns members not to write secret information in a letter, do not use a transparent envelope to mail organization documents, and pay post office box fees on time (UK/BM-38 Translation). However, this design may be deliberate as the manual may be used for new recruits, and must be simplistic because the information is new to the personnel.

In chapter six, the author delineates training requirements. The most relevant to the human resources frame is the creation of a specific training plan for each trainee. This indicates that members receive individual attention and training is based on ability. The classes and instructor-student ratios are small, which enhances the quality of training (UK/BM-45 Translation). Al-Qaida recognize the importance of training to the organization as noted in the creation and promulgation of specialized training manuals. This critical element of the human resources frame is part of Al-Qaida’s organizational culture and increases its power.

Chapter seven relates to the purchase and transport of weapons. “Prior to purchasing, the seller should be tested to ensure that he is not an agent of the security apparatus” (UK/BM-48 Translation). This indicates an inherent distrust of outsiders. This distrust extends to family

and friends. Too much distrust of one's fellow humans ultimately leads to paranoia. Al-Qaida may be teetering on the brink of paranoia, or already consumed by it. However, this cannot be inferred from the training manual.

Chapter eight delineates further qualities of an Al-Qaida "overt" cell member. He should not be inquisitive, curious, chatty, or talkative. He should do his job and not call attention to himself (UK/BM-52 Translation). There are no restrictions on the appearance of an overt member, as stipulated for the "covert" or undercover member. The covert member is required to "have a general appearance that does not indicate Islamic orientation (beard, toothpick, book [long] shirt, small Koran)" and avoid Islamic expressions or famous places (UK/BM-53 Translation). Al-Qaida have religious sanction for this requirement. The author of the training manual again quotes Ibn Taimia who states, "If a Muslim is in a combat or godless area, he is not obligated to have a different appearance from [those around him]. The [Muslim] man may prefer or even be obligated to look like them, provided his action brings a religious benefit of preaching to them, learning their secrets and informing Muslims, preventing their harm, or some other beneficial goal" (UK/BM-77 Translation). One can infer that if a person looks or acts Islamic, they are not part of an undercover cell, but may be a supporter of terrorist acts and operations. Another analysis point is that Al-Qaida have a religious obligation to blend into the area of an operation. However, the passage clearly states that part of the reasons for these actions is to prevent the harming of Muslims. Al-Qaida no longer follow this requirement as demonstrated in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, which occurred after the manual was written, where over 5,000 Muslims were killed or injured. This is another indication of the age of the training manual and the structural conflict between rational and irrational.

Of all the members of an Al-Qaida cell, the commander is the most important (UK/BM-55 Translation). Al-Qaida realize the human resources difficulty of replacing a member of what they consider to be a "high" caliber. The labor intensity and time requirements of the "hiring" process of a high level employee are detrimental to Al-Qaida's fast paced organizational culture.

The author notes, regarding the presence of wives, that members should not travel with them since their veils attract attention (UK/BM-55 Translation). This indicates that covert Al-Qaida operatives will not travel with women. They will be alone or in pairs of men. Additionally, Al-Qaida would never use a woman in a covert mission because they could not blend into their surroundings, as they are not permitted to remove their veils under any circumstances.

Chapter nine reviews the method of implementing a security plan. The author states, “There should be a security plan for each activity that is subject to being uncovered by the enemy” (UK/BM-57 Translation). Therefore, planning is a critical element to Al-Qaida’s organization. Additionally, plans should be tailored to an individual so he knows what to do if captured and members must thoroughly learn their roles in the plan (UK/BM-57 Translation). Al-Qaida plans are created with deniability in mind.

Conditions of a security plan include: realism, coordination, simplicity, creativity, flexibility, and secrecy (UK/BM-57 Translation). This demonstrates that Al-Qaida allow its members to think on their own. In reference to coordination, different cells have different responsibilities regarding the planning and implementation of an operation. The goal is to design the act as if it were “a continuous and linked chain of events” (UK/BM-57 Translation). According to the author, this is to give the enemy the impression that Al-Qaida are larger, more organized, and more powerful than they really are. It is a type of deception. As Sun Tzu states, “All warfare is based on deception” (Sun Tzu, 1963, p.66). Mao Tse-tung paraphrases Sun Tzu when he states, “It is often possible by adopting all kinds of measures of deception to drive the enemy into the plight of making erroneous judgments and taking erroneous actions, thus depriving him of his superiority and initiative” (Mao Tse-tung, 1955, p.98). One must keep this in mind when attributing capabilities to the Al-Qaida terrorist organization.

Al-Qaida are sophisticated enough that they understand the necessity for training. In chapter nine, the author delineates questions that a traveling Al-Qaida member might encounter and urges the member to have the answers memorized to prevent possible conflicts with the

enemy “security apparatus” (UK/BM-58-59 Translation). In chapter twelve, the manual reminds those who are conducting surveillance by car that they need to be an experienced driver (UK/BM-88 Translation). Those who are taking photographs need to be experienced in film processing and developing (UK/BM-73 Translation), again reinforcing training and secrecy. In chapter fourteen, Al-Qaida restrict a member from setting booby traps until he has mastered explosives and “successfully worked in the electrical and mechanical fields, because the first mistake a brother makes could be his last mistake” (UK/BM-148 Translation). This demonstrates Al-Qaida’s concern for the training investment, concern for their personnel, and the availability of mobility and variation in the organization through training opportunities. When discussing the preparation of poisons, the author of the training manual states that he “will limit [the discussion] to poisons that the holy warrior can prepare and use without endangering his health” (UK/BM-73 Translation). Note the organization’s continued concern for a member’s health and well being as delineated above in the original fourteen membership requirements (UK/BM-16 Translation).

Chapter ten delineates aspects of Al-Qaida special tactical operations. It begins with a list of characteristics needed to become a member of this type of specialized group. These eleven elements are: physical and combat fitness; previous special operations training, i.e., assassination, assault, kidnapping, and bombing; cleverness; intelligence, precision, and alertness; a calm personality; ability to keep secrets; common sense during interrogation; quick decision making; patience and religiousness; courage and boldness; and unknown to the enemy (UK/BM-69 Translation). The following human resources reasons indicate why special operations are important:

- 1) Boosting Islamic morale and lowering that of the enemy.

- 2) Preparing and training new members for future tasks.

[This author’s analysis: this can be equated to “on-the-job” training.]

- 3) A form of necessary punishment.

[This author’s analysis: an Al-Qaida goal is to commit violent acts.]

- 4) Bringing new members to the Organization’s ranks (UK/BM-70 Translation).

[This author's analysis: recruiting.]

Al-Qaida also recognize human resources disadvantages. For instance, the morale issue is a double-edged sword. In the case of repeated failures, enemy morale will increase, while Al-Qaida morale will decrease. "Members of the Organization lose faith in themselves and their leaders in case of repeatedly failed special operations. The inverse is also true" (UK/BM-70 Translation). The success of the World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings must have given Al-Qaida a spiritual boost that most likely hardened their resolve to continue their mission. One can be assured that plans for future attacks are in the works, even with the U.S. attacks of Al-Qaida infrastructure in Afghanistan.

During the planning stage of an operation, the commander decides who will be involved, how many, and what type of training is necessary. Meetings before and after the operation are held to familiarize the group with the plan and collect evaluation and feedback data, respectively. The plan must also include the type of difficulties the team may encounter and ensure understanding through the member's repetition of orders (UK/BM-72-73 Translation).

The execution stage begins with a rehearsal "in place similar to that of the real operation" (UK/BM-73 Translation), the implementation, and concludes with an evaluation of the completed mission. A full report is then sent up the chain of command to the "commanders of the Organization," most likely the consultation council, though the manual does not specifically state this (UK/BM-73 Translation). Human resources considerations before the operation include:

- 1) The operation should be appropriate to the participants' physical and mental abilities and capabilities.
- 2) The participants should be selected from volunteers, not draftees.
- 3) Roles should be distributed according to the members' physical and moral abilities.
- 4) The operation members should not all be told about the operation until shortly before executing it in order to avoid leaking of its news (UK/BM-73 Translation).

Human resources considerations after the operation include:

- 1) The operation should be completely evaluated as far as advantages and disadvantages. Also, each member of the operation should be evaluated according to his assigned role.
- 2) Each member who succeeded in his role should be rewarded, and each member who was weak or slacken in his role should be dismissed. [The manual does not give any more information on the Al-Qaida reward/punishment system. This may be a good area for future study.]
- 3) Hiding or sending abroad those who executed the operation.
- 4) Defending members who participated in the operation in case they are captured, and taking care of their families (UK/BM-73 Translation). [This indicates that Al-Qaida have a social responsibility to their members.]

Chapter eleven justifies spying and the beating of hostages by quoting the prophet Muhammad who says, “Islam is supreme and there is nothing above it” (UK/BM-77 Translation). The author concludes that, “Since Islam is superior to all human conditions and earthly religions, it permits spying for itself but not for others. Islam, therefore, fights so the word of Allah can become supreme. Others fight for worldly gains and lowly and inferior goals” (UK/BM-77 Translation). This reiterates the justness of the Al-Qaida cause and gives them leave to conduct violence and spying, as they deem necessary. The author continues by saying,

“In this tradition, we find permission to interrogate the hostage for the purpose of obtaining information. It is permitted to strike the non-believer who has no covenant until he reveals the news, information, and secrets of his people. The religious scholars have also permitted the killing of a hostage if he insists on withholding information from Muslims.

They permitted his killing so that he would not inform his people of what he learned about the Muslim condition, number, and secrets” (UK/BM-79 Translation).

Al-Qaida’s behavior toward a hostage is clear; they will beat him for information and if not satisfied with the answers, will kill him.

Al-Qaida leave nothing to chance during a hostage interrogation. They use specially

trained personnel who have seven characteristics:

- 1) Knowledge and expertise about people's behavior and morals.
- 2) Strong personality.
- 3) Possess a sixth sense based on practice and experience.
- 4) Extremely patient.
- 5) Able to act, pretend, and mask himself.
- 6) Intelligent, observant, analytical, and deductive.
- 7) Able to establish an investigative plan. [The manual does not expound on this.]

(UK/BM-92 Translation).

When Al-Qaida members are captured and interrogated, the author tells the reader that the member will be frightened, but should not talk during the ordeal. He states,

“The interrogator cannot obtain what he wants and extract any information unless the brother talks. The brother may think that by giving a little information he can avoid harm and torture. However, the opposite is true. The torture and harm would intensify to obtain additional information, and that cycle would repeat. Thus, the brother should be patient, resistant, silent, and prayerful to Allah, especially if the security apparatus knows little about him” (UK/BM-166-167 Translation).

The author continues to say that if a member does break down, it is Al-Qaida's fault for choosing a poor representative. That is why testing of Al-Qaida members should be done prior to sending them on a mission. This testing is through a simulation of an interrogation. As a result, Al-Qaida depend on secrecy for their continued existence. They say, “Important information should not be discussed with the brothers, as they might reveal it during the interrogation” (UK/BM-169 Translation).

If the member is taken to prison, he is ordered not to accept work that may belittle or demean him or fellow Muslims, such as cleaning the bathrooms or hallways. He needs to create an Islamic program for himself, be a model of selflessness, and help fellow Islamic men. Finally, he needs to utilize the time in prison in a positive way by continuing to pray and worship God

and memorizing the Koran (UK/BM-176 Translation).

Special training is also provided for Al-Qaida recruiters of “secret” agents. The manual is not concerned with how they are trained, but who potential candidates may be and motives of enticement. As stated earlier, this is a very sophisticated section and makes reference to CIA standards and preferences. The stages of recruitment are related to human resources:

- 1) Finding the agent [selection and hiring].
- 2) Evaluating the agent.
- 3) Approaching the agent [friendship].
- 4) Recruiting directly (offering a salary) or indirectly (obtaining information without the candidate knowing).
- 5) Testing the agent for ability, loyalty, and dependability.
- 6) Training the agent:
 - a) Work secrecy and means of gathering and hiding information.
 - b) The method of passing information on to officials.
 - c) Concealment and disguising.
 - d) Interrogation and resisting the interrogation.
 - e) Explaining the assigned mission in utmost detail.
 - f) Photography.
- 7) Treating the agent (maintaining strong personal relationship or rough treatment of the agent).
- 8) Terminating services [the document does not indicate how] (UK/BM-94-97 Translation).

When discussing public information gathering, Al-Qaida use an overt member or someone who is considered a “regular person,” such as a college graduate. They deem this type of activity as not dangerous and simple, such that anyone could do it (UK/BM-81 Translation). Areas to search for information include: newspapers, magazines, radio, television, the public’s comments, and jokes (UK/BM-73 Translation). Al-Qaida are very sophisticated

as they know that understanding the enemy mind is critical to victory.

Finally, the last chapter discusses the importance of teamwork within the organization. The author says that God ordains teamwork. If a member abandons a team, then he is disobeying God (UK/BM- 180 Translation). This last lesson instills Al-Qaida control within the group. As Al-Qaida are God's messenger, if one disobeys the Organization's rules and orders, one also disobeys God, and that is the worst thing a Muslim can do. While we have observed that Al-Qaida has allowed creativity and flexibility, we see that it is only in specific, well-defined areas. Any deviation from the

course set by the leaders of Al-Qaida, is a sin. This sets a harsh human resources climate for the member of Al-Qaida.

2. Frame Applications

As noted in the last section, the Al-Qaida training manual makes many references to the human resources frame. In this organization, Al-Qaida exist to serve their needs first, then they consider the human needs of their members. Normally this would destabilize an organization, but Al-Qaida have gotten around this problem by declaring that God or the Prophet Muhammad ordained the rules and objectives. However, to a certain extent, Al-Qaida are interested in training, evaluation, and organizational mobility for their members. They have met Bolman and Deal's human resources assumption that people and organizations need each other: people need opportunities and salaries; organizations need talent, ideas, and energy (Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.102-103). Al-Qaida utilize job matching and a reward and punishment structure to continue this positive interaction. They even have a response for when the fit between members and an organization is poor. If a member breaks under interrogation or cannot successfully complete his training, he is dismissed from the organization otherwise one or both of the parties would suffer. Al-Qaida prefer efficiency and minimal conflict within the group and this is one way to prevent it. Al-Qaida's goal is to have the right member for the right job as a good fit benefits both parties (Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.102-103).

When reviewing Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs (as cited in Bolman and Deal, 1997,

pp.104- 105), Al-Qaida seem to have met their physiological need or basic survival needs for food, water, and shelter through the financial support of Osama bin Laden and the earlier state sponsorship of Sudan and the Taliban. Currently, they are trying to attain the level of the need for safety or being safe from danger or attack as both state sponsors and havens have been lost. This is difficult as several Western powers have declared a war against them in November 2001. Al-Qaida have not reached Maslow's (as cited in Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.104- 105) third level of need: love and belongingness, as they are not structurally social even though their social, religious, and kinship ties are often quite strong. While members work in teams, they do not bond as they may be required to kill each other. A transient, warped sense of "love" may exist between members because they only have each other, but love and belongingness defined as positive, loving relationships with others, does not exist for them. This author cannot conceive that Al-Qaida can ever achieve Maslow's (as cited in Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.104- 105) fifth level of esteem, as they do not value themselves and others (Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.104- 105). This is apparent in the training manual's membership criteria of sacrifice and the many Al-Qaida suicide attacks conducted throughout the world. Al-Qaida members are required to kill themselves and their comrades at a moments notice. Ultimately, however, they defer to the will of God for success or failure. If they succeed, it is preordained; if they fail, it is preordained (UK/BM-180 Translation).

In Chris Argyris' *Theory X and Theory Y* (as cited in Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.105- 106) realm, Al-Qaida follow a combination of both. They utilize "Theory X," and assume some of their members are lazy, passive, resistant to change, and lacking ambition. To control these members, Al-Qaida leaders use religion, threats, coercion, strict rules, and punishment. This ultimately decreases productivity and increases antagonism, so Al-Qaida acknowledge "Theory Y," which states that managers are aware that employees have needs and try to accommodate those needs. This is seen through the development of specialized training such as special tactical operations and recruiting and a reward system for work done well. Members are asked for input during operational planning stages, and evaluations when the task has been completed (Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.105- 106).

Chris Argyris (as cited in Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.106-111) argues that people dislike the mundane and seek to improve their personal abilities. Argyris states that if an employee is forced into repetitive tasks, he gets frustrated and can retaliate against the organization (as cited in Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.106-111). Al-Qaida protect against this by allowing organizational mobility for their members. Members can be overt or covert parts of a cell depending on their expertise. Both can aspire to commander of a cell. Commanders can eventually become part of the five-committee structure and committee members may advance to the consultation council. The training manual does not refer to these advancements and this author has found no document defining a time-line for these advancements. Additionally, advancements do not necessarily occur in a traditional hierarchical sense. It is assumed that Al-Qaida promote from within and, in that sense, are similar to the U.S. military organizational structure, in which no lateral entry occurs due to the critical, sensitive nature of their work (Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.106-111).

It is uncertain from the manual whether Al-Qaida have a long-term human resource philosophy. It is not one of their stated objectives. However, Al-Qaida are aware that people are critical for their continued success and perhaps they are considering building this philosophy into the corporate structure and rewards system. We do know that Al-Qaida invest in people: they hire the right people and reward them, provide job security, promote from within, train and educate, and re-train existing cadres. We do not know from the training manual if Al-Qaida share their wealth or profits with their members.

To an extent, members are empowered and can redesign their work. They are semi-autonomous when developing security and tactical plans, members of cells participate in the planning and execution stages, teamwork is not only emphasized, it is required by God, and jobs can be enriched by the availability of training. This author is not convinced that Al-Qaida want to ensure egalitarianism and upward influence within the group as their focus is based on religious mandates that exonerates Al-Qaida members from any failure (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.123). The religious element, which may be the only reasonable explanation of what motivates members, of the Al-Qaida training manual is presented in the symbolic frame section.

When reviewing Argyris and Schon's (as cited in Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.144-149) "Model I" theory that argues that all organizations are competitive and dangerous to the individual resulting in defensiveness, wasted energy, poor decisions, lack of accountability, and strained relationships, there is no doubt that Al-Qaida are a competitive and dangerous place to work. However, Al-Qaida do try to utilize the "Model II" theory (as cited in Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.144-149), or the idea that common goals, mutual influence, open communication, and the combination of advocacy with inquiry can be emphasized. This is delineated very clearly in the training manual. In a sense, Al-Qaida agree with Argyris and Schon (as cited in Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.144-149) in that they believe that this behavior promotes positive dialogue and increases the unity of the group, ultimately increasing employee satisfaction and, therefore, organization productivity. As such, according to the human resources frame, Al-Qaida have met most of the requirements for a successful organization.

E. AL-QAIDA – SYMBOLIC FRAME

The symbolic frame takes ideas from cultural and social anthropology. It conceptualizes organizations as a carnival, tribe, or theater and focuses on the irrational more so than the other frames. As with the last two sections, this one reviews the symbolic representations contained in the Al-Qaida training manual and analyzes its fit within Bolman and Deal's theory (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.213).

1. Training Manual Elements

The Al-Qaida training manual begins with a drawing of the globe with a Middle East and Africa orientation and a sword through it (UK/BM-169 Translation). If a picture is worth a thousand words, this tells the Al-Qaida member that violence will be part of his life. During the presentation and throughout the text, the author uses words to convey an image or feeling. For example, phrases like, 'those champions,' 'wrote with their blood and sufferings,' "slaughter them like lambs," and 'be a pick of destruction,' convey very clear symbolic meaning through the use of metaphors (UK/BM-3, 5 Translation). In the following example, the author uses words as a symbolic 'call to arms' to excite and motivate Al-Qaida members who are reading

the text. He writes, “O young men waging holy war for the sake of Allah, there is still hope in you. Your country awaits you, your brothers await you, your wives await you, the Muslim hostages await you” (UK/BM-172 Translation).

Symbolism is incorporated into religion to justify Al-Qaida rhetoric. The word “martyr” is used several times in the text to let the member know that this is something the organization favors (UK/BM-7 Translation). Also, it is a powerful and motivational term in the context of Islamic culture. The author quotes the Koran, “And Allah’s enemies plotted and planned, and Allah too planned, and the best of planners is Allah” (UK/BM-7 Translation), when describing how the regimes in Afghanistan opened Western-style schools and clubs, with the idea of producing a “wasted” generation that did not follow Islamic ideals. It reinforces the idea that the rulers of Afghanistan are the enemies of Allah, so Allah opposes them, and therefore, so does Al-Qaida. This confirms the proposition that opposing the enemy is just.

Sheik Ibn Taimia states, “It is necessary that all Adam’s children obey” (UK/BM-6 Translation). This reinforces Al-Qaida’s requirement for immediate obedience in all things. On a grander scale, it represents a justification for the overthrow of “godless regimes” as “Adam’s children” refers to Muslims, Christians, and Jews. In Al-Qaida’s mind, all these people must obey God and therefore be subjugated by Al-Qaida because they are the “true” [author’s emphasis] emissaries of God.

The author uses stories and metaphors to make a point. When describing the reason that Al-Qaida formed he writes, “However, majestic Allah turned their deception back on them, as a large group of those young men who were raised by them [the rulers] woke up from their sleep and returned to Allah, regretting and repenting” (UK/BM-8 Translation). This indicates the Al-Qaida realized that the regime in Afghanistan was corrupt and decided to do something about it. When discussing the necessity for communication, the author states, “However, it is a double-edged sword: It can be to our advantage if we use it well and it can be a knife dug into our back if we do not consider and take the necessary security measures” (UK/BM-29 Translation). This presents a very visual image of what happens if a member does not protect his communications. When describing the responsibilities of the member in charge of a weapons

storage area, the author cautions to, “not visit the arsenal frequently, nor toy with the weapons” (UK/BM-50 Translation). This may indicate that members have done this before because they may have been bored, or they enjoy “playing” with guns. This phrasing lets the member know that Al-Qaida considers this childish and would humiliate the member if he was caught in the weapons storage area.

In chapter two, the author connects stories from history to reinforce the need for certain attributes in an Al-Qaida member. When writing about maturity, he tells a story about a fourteen-year-old who wanted to go to battle, but was told to wait. When the boy was fifteen, he was allowed to join the soldiers. This indicates to the reader that the mental, physical, and intellectual fitness needed for Al-Qaida work is not found in a minor (UK/BM-15 Translation). In another story relating to listening and obedience, the Prophet Muhammad sent a soldier to get information and not alarm the people. The soldier was tempted to kill the enemy leader, but remembered the orders just in time, and followed them (UK/BM-15-16 Translation). This reinforces Al-Qaida’s concept of discipline. Another story describes a World War I German spy who uses intelligence and insight to discover a secret project for arming old commercial ships (UK/BM-17 Translation). He achieved this through the use of deception, which is a critical component of the Al-Qaida structure.

The idea of caution and prudence is exemplified in a story about a Roman soldier who disguises himself as a slave to learn about the enemies’ position and numbers. When slapped, he does not complain as he acts as a slave and does not reveal himself (UK/BM-17-18 Translation). This story reinforces the caution and prudence concept, but also teaches a potential outcome of deception: one may be hurt or humiliated. Another story that teaches a concept, but also contains a hidden meaning is the story of the spy who disguised himself as a fur merchant. He was not cautious or prudent and talked to everyone he saw. Since he did not know about furs, the people realized he was a fake and stayed away from him. As a result, he could not complete his mission. The story demonstrates caution and prudence, but also reinforces the idea that a member needs to know his information if he is on a covert mission

(UK/BM-18 Translation).

The author uses stories about the Prophet Muhammad and how he dealt with spies to justify Al-Qaida's precepts. According to a story, Muhammad hired spies and paid them well for their work. He preferred spies that were trustworthy. As a result, Al-Qaida follow this practice and uses spies to gather covert information. The Prophet Muhammad also gave permission to "Find and kill him" when an enemy spy escaped (UK/BM-79 Translation), so Al-Qaida have no problem killing anyone who gathers information about their organization.

The author writes about activities in terms of theater. He states that, "He would *control his reactions* and managed to *skillfully play his role*" (UK/BM-19 Translation), describing an Al-Qaida member's actions in terms of elements an actor would use on a stage. Appearance and disguise are elements of theater and repeated throughout the training manual. This is seen in the repeated instruction to shave one's beard when on covert missions and when taking photographs for false documents. Using wigs or glasses are also common Al-Qaida practices (UK/BM-22, 37, 73 Translation).

Symbols or special signals are critical in dangerous circumstances such as meeting in a public area or at a hideout. A signal may be keys, beads, a newspaper, or a scarf, which indicates it is safe to proceed or there is danger. These signals must be prearranged (UK/BM-35 Translation). Codes and ciphers are a symbolic representation of words and used to send messages to other cells and groups (UK/BM-102 Translation).

Al-Qaida use religious symbolism to explain success and failure. The author states, "The work will be successful if Allah grants that" (UK/BM-57 Translation). It is up to God if an operation will work. If it does not, it is the will of God and the member understands he is not to blame. This concept is reiterated at the end of the text when the author states the Prophet Muhammad said,

"Let the prophecy that God wants be in you, yet God may remove it if He so wills, and then there will be a Caliphate according to the prophet's path [instruction], if God so wills it. He will also remove that [the Caliphate] if He so wills, and you will have a disobedient king if God so wills it. Once again, if God so wills, He will remove him [the

disobedient king], and you will have an oppressive king. [Finally], if God so wills, He will remove him [the oppressive kin], and you will have a Caliphate according to the prophet's path [instruction]. He then became silent" (UK/BM-180 Translation).

The previous quote states that good and bad regimes will come and go, but ultimately it is because God wills it. The author ends his text by explaining, "Lastly, each of us has to understand that we don't achieve victory against our enemies through these actions and security procedures. Rather, victory is achieved by obeying Almighty and Glorious God and because of their many sins" (UK/BM-176-180 Translation). The author is saying that while it is important to have these rules and regulations, the bottom line is that the enemy will fail because he has many sins and God is on Al-Qaida's side.

2. Frame Applications

Organizations are really cultures that concentrate on stories, myths, and heroes. Members are actors on a stage who play roles designed to impact an audience outside the organization. If the act is played poorly, problems arise (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.14). As demonstrated, Al-Qaida's culture is surrounded by symbols. Religion is the strongest symbol and is used to give meaning to activities and objectives. Stories are utilized to relay an event, but the focus is on its meaning, not what happened. This follows Bolman and Deal's first assumption in the symbolic frame (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.216). The second assumption is that events have as many meanings as people have different interpretations. Al-Qaida realize this and has created a specific culture that develops shared perceptions or visions among members of the group. For example, the bombing of the World Trade Center was a happy occasion for Al-Qaida because they achieved their goal of destroying an economic center. It was the meaning behind the event that counted for the group and the group shared the same meaning (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.216).

Bolman and Deal postulate that life is uncertain and ambiguous. What happened, why, and what happens next are puzzles (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.216). Al-Qaida are intimately aware that life is uncertain. Their knowledge comes from religion. God is the only one who

knows what will happen next. Al-Qaida take this a step further and state that whatever happens, if the group is successful or unsuccessful in an operation, is the will of Allah. As a result, they have a culture that places no blame on their members for failure. This seems to be altering slightly as members who cannot complete a mission or

training, or have family problems are dismissed. The training manual does not elaborate on what “dismissed” means.

A fourth assumption of the symbolic frame is that ambiguity prevents rational analysis, problem solving, and decision making (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.216). This is not the case in Al-Qaida. While they know that God ultimately controls things, Al-Qaida leadership is very sophisticated and maintains a high level of rational analysis and decision making. However, they balance that with awareness that the members may get confused and be uncertain about their roles. As a result, they keep tasks simple and separate from other cells. They create training manuals that are focused, easy to read, and understand. They use Koranic verses, metaphors, myths, and stories to provide direction and anchors for the members. This decreases confusion and increases predictability, allowing members to feel more comfortable in their roles.

A final assumption states that events and processes form a cultural tapestry of secular myths, stories, ceremonies, and rituals that assist people in finding passion, purpose, and meaning (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.216). As demonstrated above, Al-Qaida utilize these tools to form cohesion within the group. The training manual utilizes myths and stories to anchor the present in the past, explain, legitimize, and create solidarity and cohesion. They also convey an organization’s morals and values (Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.220-221). One of Al-Qaida’s goals is to return to the old ways. The problem arises in this frame if this prevents people from seeing current opportunities and new information. While not discussed in the training manual, Al-Qaida leadership are very aware of political, economic, informational, and military shifts around the globe. It is uncertain to this author how the leadership alters symbolism to accommodate new ideas and rhetoric.

Rituals and ceremonies are tools that give an organization structure. They clarify roles,

predict events, convey messages, and anchor a person to the group (Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.222-223). The training manual uses its many instructions as the functional equivalent to the idea of ritual.

Humor, metaphor, and play are also critical elements to the symbolic frame. All serve to dissipate threatening concepts (Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.229-231). The Al-Qaida training manual does not demonstrate humor or play, but does make extensive use of metaphors. These metaphors simplify concepts for Al-Qaida members and create a sense of emotionalism based on the visual images the symbols bring to mind.

Bolman and Deal postulate that organizational processes are really theater (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.241). As we see in the training manual, Al-Qaida can be interpreted as a theater. Their members play different roles: some recruit, some are commanders, some make plans, some conduct special operations, some create poisons, while others make explosives. Each role can be enhanced through training and experience. Some of the 'actors' wear costumes such as wigs and glasses. Others must shave their beards and blend into a different group of actors.

The symbolic frame represents the most powerful element of the four frames. Symbols, through the use of religion, are Al-Qaida's key motivational tool. Based on religious ideology, Al-Qaida's vision and culture can demand that members go out and commit very irrational acts, from a Western point of view. Their culture teaches that becoming a martyr is good and the ultimate achievement of one's life. Without symbolism, the structural and human resources elements would have no meaning for this group.

F. AL-QAIDA – POLITICAL FRAME

The political frame is derived from political theory and its elements are detected in the Al-Qaida training manual. It also provides a critical basis with which to understand the Al-Qaida organization. The first section delineates political elements from the training manual followed by an analysis of its relationship to the political frame theory.

1. Training Manual Elements

The first page of the Al-Qaida training document sets the stage for the expression of Al-Qaida power to its members. It states, “It is forbidden to remove this from the house” (UK/BM-1 Translation). The author describes how Afghanistan was afflicted with evil rulers after the ouster of the British. His point is that those in power, even though they were Muslim, tortured and oppressed the people. When men tried to resist (Islamic Movement), they were thrown in jail and tortured. The men were jailed because they, “refused to move in the rulers’ orbit, obscure matters to the youth, and oppose the idea of rebelling against the rulers” (UK/BM-7 Translation). This is an example of a play for power between two opposing sides. The men did not ‘play the game.’ Subsequently, “They [the rulers] tried, using every means and [kind of] seduction, to produce a generation of young men that did not know [anything] except what they [the rulers] want, did not live except according to their [the rulers’] way, and did not dress except in their [the rulers’] clothes” (UK/BM-8 Translation). “Seduction” is a metaphor for manipulation. Ultimately, the rulers had all the power.

The author then lists non-believing Islamic leaders that tortured and killed Muslims in other areas, i.e., Sadat, Mubarak, Gadhafi, Assad, Saleh, and Fahed (UK/BM-8 Translation). He implies that as these leaders are “non-believers,” they are the enemy. This fits with Al-Qaida’s political objective to overthrow “godless regimes.” The author offers a political, yet violent alternative to this lack of power, “These young men realized that an Islamic government would never be established except by the bomb and rifle. Islam does not coincide or make a truce with unbelief, but rather confronts it” (UK/BM-8 Translation). Al-Qaida determined to use violence to retaliate against “apostate” regimes and not negotiate. The author states that young men were commanded to go to Afghanistan to fight a holy war, which was sanctioned by Allah. He quotes a Koranic verse that proves this, “Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies of Allah and your enemies, and others besides whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know” (UK/BM-8 Translation). The author is using religion to manipulate and justify a violent response to a regime he dislikes. The passage also gives Al-Qaida the ability to create

new enemies in the future as the Koran says that there are other enemies about which no one but God knows. On several occasions, the author reiterates that the Al-Qaida members are “fighting for the cause of Allah” (UK/BM-9, 15 Translation).

Part of the author’s contribution and reason for writing the training manual is to pave the “road that leads to majestic Allah and establishes a caliphate according to the prophecy” (UK/BM-9 Translation). His motivation is political. He wants to see a new government in Afghanistan. This is borne out as he states Al-Qaida’s main mission: “The overthrow of the godless regimes and their replacement with an Islamic regime” (UK/BM-12 Translation). He also states that Al-Qaida are critical in the establishment of “the conditions for possible confrontation with the regressive regimes and their persistence, achieving long-term goals such as the establishment of an Islamic state and short-term goals such as operations against enemy individuals and sectors, and removal of those personalities that block the call’s path” (UK/BM-13 Translation). A different handwriting adds the removal of, “All types of military and civilian intellectuals and thinkers for the State” (UK/BM-13 Translation). These goals can only be achieved through the use of violence and power.

When discussing the qualifications of an Al-Qaida member, the first criterion is to be a Muslim. This sets up religion as the force from which power is derived. It also consolidates Al-Qaida forces by creating a basis for commonality. The author justifies the requirement by arguing how any non-Muslim could fight for and defend something he does not believe in. He references the Israeli Army and their requirement to be Jewish, and the Soviet Army and their requirement to be a Communist if an officer. The author further proves that religion is the root of Al-Qaida’s political mandate. He states at the conclusion of the manual that,

“Upholding religion, which God has ordered us by His saying, ‘Uphold religion,’ will necessarily require an all out confrontation against all our enemies, who want to recreate darkness. In addition, it is imperative to stand against darkness in all arenas: the media, education, [religious] guidance, and counseling, as well as others. This will make it necessary for us to move on numerous fields so as to enable the Islamic movement to confront ignorance and achieve victory against it in the battle to uphold religion” (UK/BM-180 Translation).

Al-Qaida maintain their power by not telling the members where their funds or weapons are stored (UK/BM-22 Translation). When discussing what a member should do if enemy officials seize his documents, the answer is “negotiate.” The author exemplifies this by writing, “I’ll give you’re your passport if you give me information” (UK/BM-22 Translation). Bargaining and negotiation are critical skills for an Al-Qaida member. This is a key element of the political frame.

In chapter four, the author delineates security precautions related to apartments. The following are examples of ‘political games’ or deception tactics that are played to ensure a member’s safety and therefore his power.

- 1) Providing the necessary cover for the people who frequent the apartment.
- 2) Agreement on special ways of knocking on the door and prior to entry.
- 3) Having documents at hand and on display supporting the undercover member.
- 4) The cover should blend well with the environment.
- 5) The cover of those who frequent the location should match the cover of the location (UK/BM-26-27 Translation).

In chapter five, the author talks about deception of the enemy, which is another form of power play. Regarding communications he states, “When the command is certain that a particular telephone [line] is being monitored, it can exploit it by providing information that misleads the enemy and benefits the work plan” (UK/BM-31 Translation). If the line is clear, the member should use special codes when talking on the telephone (UK/BM-54 Translation). For transportation during a covert activity, “The car or motorcycle color should be changed before the operation and returned to the original after the operation” (UK/BM-41 Translation). Also, the license plate should be falsified, rotating numbers to make them hard to remember (UK/BM-42 Translation).

Pfeffer states that information or knowledge is a base or type of power (Pfeffer, 1992, p.30). In chapter seven, the author states that when buying weapons, do not tell the seller for

what purpose they are needed (UK/BM-48 Translation). In chapter eight, an undercover member is urged to, “Have complete and accurate knowledge of the security status related to those around him in his place of work and residence, so that no danger of harm would catch him unaware” (UK/BM-53 Translation). Further, the agent is to “maintain his family and neighborhood relationships and should not show any changes towards them so that they would not attempt to bring him back [from the Organization] for security reasons” (UK/BM-53 Translation). This would give his family and friends informational power over him and prevent him from completing his mission or continue his participation in Al-Qaida. Similarly, is the stipulation that a member should “not under go a sudden change in his daily routine or relationships that precede his Jihad work” (UK/BM-54 Translation). The following quote from the training manual epitomizes the use of knowledge as a form of power. General Mahmoud Sheet Khattab said,

“The nation that wants to achieve victory over its enemy must know that enemy very well. It also must know the site of the battle in detail. Those who fight an enemy that they do not know, do not win because a successful military plan must be built on clear and trustworthy information. The commander who fights an enemy and does not know his strength (number and materiel) is blind and destined to fail and fall” (UK/BM-80 Translation).

Power can also trap an Al-Qaida member; it is a double-edged sword. The author warns of the enemy’s “excitement trap,” which consists of praising or insulting the Al-Qaida organization. The object is to excite the member into a reaction that will mark him as part of the group (UK/BM-54 Translation). This results in the member’s capture, interrogation, possible torture, and detention, in other words, his loss of power.

All Al-Qaida members need to have a pre-planned story to tell the captors (UK/BM-60 Translation). This empowers the member to resist hardships. The reverse is that if a member is captured and is an important part of Al-Qaida, “whatever is necessary should be done before the enemy discovers anything” (UK/BM-64 Translation). Does this mean killing the member? That would be the ultimate power play, but would also cause conflict within the

ranks. However, the author closes with a warning, “Every word that the brother utters in the prosecution center makes a negative impact on him, on his colleagues, and later, on the judgment and major decisions” (UK/BM-163 Translation). While power can be used wisely by Al-Qaida, one misstep can severely damage the organization, causing conflict.

Political motivation is clearly demonstrated in the explanation of the importance and disadvantages of conducting special operations. Special operations are important because they increase Al-Qaida’s power through the:

- 1) Mocking the regime’s admiration among the population.
- 2) Removing the personalities that stand in the way of the [Islamic] Da’wa [Call].
- 3) Agitating [the population] regarding publicized matters.
- 4) Rejecting compliance with and submission to the regime’s practices.
- 5) Giving legitimacy to the Jama’a [Islamic group].
- 6) Spreading fear and terror through the regime’s ranks (UK/BM-70 Translation).

The disadvantages of special operations that result in conflict and the loss of Al-Qaida power are:

- 1) Restraining the [Islamic] Da’wa [Call] and preachers.
- 2) Revealing the structure of the Military Organization.
- 3) Financially draining the Military Organization [contest over scarce resources].
- 4) Use of [operations] as propaganda against the Jama’a [Islamic group].
- 5) Spreading fear and terror among the population.
- 6) The regime’s safeguards and precautions against any other operation.
- 7) Special operations cannot cause the fall of the regime in power.
- 8) Increases in failed [operation] attempts cause an increase in the regime’s credibility.
- 9) [Operations] cause the regime to assassinate the Jama’a [Islamic group] leaders (UK/BM-70 Translation).

2. Frame Applications

The training manual demonstrates many instances of the use of power and resultant conflict that is the basis to Bolman and Deal's analysis of the political frame. There is no doubt the Al-Qaida wield power effectively. While they are a violent, action-oriented organization, they extensively use the ideas of manipulation and bargaining to achieve their ends. They are very Machiavellian in their outlook. If a member fails to achieve a goal, Al-Qaida dismiss him. If enemy authorities stop a member, he is trained to negotiate his way out of the situation. Remember, even though Al-Qaida give the appearance of being a religious organization, their goal is political: the overthrow of governments. They are a political organization, designed for maneuvering in the political arena.

Al-Qaida use religion as a tool to build culture to achieve their ends. Perhaps if members were made aware of this fact, they would be less likely to follow Al-Qaida's ideology, as it does not support the true precepts of Islam. Pfeffer's definition of power fits Al-Qaida's actions as they influence behavior, change the course of events, overcome resistance, and get people to do what they would not otherwise do (Pfeffer, 1992, p.30). Al-Qaida are dangerous in the sense that they are expert manipulators. They have convinced over 5,000 members that killing innocent victims is part of God's will according to the Islamic religion. How does this further their goals when it turns the Islamic community against them? That is where it gets complicated. Perhaps Al-Qaida have a deeper, hidden goal not expressed in the training manual, or they are an amoral structure that will do anything to remake the world in their image. If the latter is the case, the world is dealing with a group of megalomaniacs and should expect the unexpected. This goes back to the discussion of rational versus irrational. This author believes that in their mind, Al-Qaida are acting 'rationally.' The question is, is it rational for their true political objectives. Before this question can be answered, further study in this area is necessary utilizing more current Al-Qaida publications.

According to Bolman and Deal's theory, organizations are jungles or arenas where people compete for scarce resources, are forced to bargain and negotiate, and form coalitions for survival (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.14). Al-Qaida are a coalition that formed to protect

themselves and their interests from the threat of Soviet occupation. This follows Bolman and Deal's first assumption of the political frame (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.163). As time progressed, this objective expanded to include the overthrow of all godless regimes, including Islamic governments seemingly influenced by Western thought. Power is the ultimate goal of the political frame and Al-Qaida is an expert in its use and are sophisticated enough to realize that power concentrated in the wrong place or if too dispersed, accomplishes nothing (Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.14, 163).

The second assumption of the political frame is that coalition members have "enduring differences" in information, beliefs, values, interests, and perceptions of reality (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.163). As seen above, Al-Qaida select their members based on very specific criteria. While a diverse group, i.e., coming from many countries, Al-Qaida are able to maintain a core leadership who have common interests and goals that were developed during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This author believes that as time progresses, new members of Al-Qaida will bring different views and therefore disruptive elements into the group, causing conflict.

The third assumption of this frame is that the most important decisions involve an allocation of scarce resources (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.163). The training manual does not specifically address financial considerations for training and operations development. The only indicator of scarce financial resources is the relative absence of technical equipment such as telephones, fax machines, and radios. Of course, as this author maintains, the manual is very old and these technology restrictions have most likely been overcome, especially with the advent of the Internet. Another area where scarce resources play a role is during the creation of an operations plan; it must be approved by the chain of command. An assumption is that it is reviewed for financial feasibility. A third reference to scarce resources is the secrecy surrounding the location of weapons storage areas and places where funds are hidden. Finally, the Al-Qaida member is reminded not to be wasteful.

Bolman and Deal postulate that enduring differences and scarce resources create *conflict* that is central in organizational dynamics with *power* being the most important resource

(Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.163). Al-Qaida has demonstrated above that it has conflict and resolves it through the use of power, whether it is directed at its external enemies or internal problems. This author believes that enduring differences will increase over time as new members will bring differing viewpoints and philosophies. However, the problem with scarce resources will decrease over time. This is a result of the increase in faster, more secure communications, i.e., the Internet, the greater availability of weapons, i.e., obtainable from the former Soviet Union, and the increased support of like-minded terrorist organizations and state sponsors as a result of the successful attack of the United States in the 2001 World Trade Center bombing.

The final political frame assumption is that goals and decisions emerge from bargaining, negotiation, and jockeying for position among different stakeholders (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.163). While this is possible within Al-Qaida, the training manual does not refer to upper-level decision making. However, it is clear that lower levels have little influence on group policy or decision making. All they can do is present a plan and wait for it to be approved or disapproved. A study on top-level decision making within the Al-Qaida organization would be of significant help to the intelligence community.

Pfeffer's eight bases of power are all present in the Al-Qaida training manual (Pfeffer, 1992, p.1 and Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.167, 247). Commanders and the upper echelons have positional power and control of rewards. Information power is available to all members. The top levels of the organizational structure maintain coercive power, alliances and networks, access and control of agendas, and framing through the control of symbols and meaning. All members have personal power as they are sanctioned by God to do this type of work.

Al-Qaida thrive on conflict. It gives them more power. According to Savage, an organization needs to understand a stakeholder's or member's potential for threat or cooperation (Savage, 1991, p.63). In Al-Qaida's case, the member is less powerful than the organization, so the potential for threat to the organization from this stakeholder decreases. Also, the member supports the organization's viewpoint, or he would not be a member, so again the potential for threat decreases. As Al-Qaida are an independent and powerful

organization, the member has less power and therefore, is not a threat to the organization (Savage, 1991, p.64).

Bolman and Deal discuss three types of conflict that are not clearly delineated in the Al-Qaida training manual: horizontal, vertical, and cultural conflict (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.173). While not necessarily bad, their argument of increased creativity, encouragement of new ideas, and stimulation of curiosity cannot be determined within the group (Bolman and Deal, 1997, p.172). This is another area for future research.

The final area of relevance to the political frame deals with the four skills, i.e., agenda setting, mapping the political terrain, networking and forming coalitions, and bargaining and negotiation, required to successfully maneuver in the frame (Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.179-186). As with the three types of conflict, the Al-Qaida training manual does not discuss this. It would behoove the intelligence community to apply further research to determining how and if Al-Qaida accomplish them.

As demonstrated above, the political frame is not based on rationality. The world is an arena for contests of power. Only the most savvy survive. Conflict controls all interactions. Coalitions, strategy, and tactics are the key tools for success. Al-Qaida represents this frame very well.

a. Four Frames Synopsis

The previous sections have noted many aspects of the four frameworks model. The following delineates key discoveries within each frame.

(1) Structural Frame Summary. Al-Qaida are a very structurally rational group that emphasize formality and a specific chain of command coupled with allowances for creativity and semi-autonomy. The structure is flat, as a shift has occurred to a network style with cells and clusters with interaction between all members. Ideology and religion are the glue that hold the organization together and which are incorporated into Al-Qaida military procedures and training.

(2) Human Resources Frame Summary. Al-Qaida invest in people: they hire the right people for the right job, reward and punish them, provide job security,

promote from within, train and educate, and re-train existing cadres. Religious mandates exonerate Al-Qaida members from failure. The workforce is very sophisticated with common goals, mutual influence, and open communication as part of the culture. Al-Qaida have a social responsibility to their members and job mobility is a critical consideration.

(3) Symbolic Frame Summary. Symbols such as verses from the Koran, stories, myths, and metaphors from the past, and rituals in the form of training and procedures are Al-Qaida's key motivational tools. Symbolism is incorporated into religion to justify Al-Qaida rhetoric and give meaning to activities and objectives. These symbols have created a unique culture that allows Al-Qaida to develop shared perceptions or visions among their members. Without symbolism, the structural and human resources elements would have no meaning for this group.

(4) Political Frame Summary. Al-Qaida hold political power over their members and enemies. They play a game through violence with their enemy, and bargaining and negotiation to manipulate their members to achieve delineated goals. Their main goal is to replace "godless regimes" with their own form of government. All Al-Qaida members have power in that God sanctions their actions.

G. AL-QAIDA POLICY REVIEW

The following is intended as a brief overview of Al-Qaida's terrorist policy based on language gleaned from their training manual. It is a cursory review as a detailed policy review is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is, however, a point of departure for future research of Al-Qaida documents. This section reviews Al-Qaida policy in terms of problem identification, alternative selection (proposed and selected), implementation (short- and long-term goals), recruiting and training criteria, and concludes with a discussion of metrics to determine the effectiveness of their training.

Based on a translation of an Al-Qaida Training Manual, this terrorist group recommends the following actions: a return to the "old ways," focus on "true" religion, active implementation, recruitment, training, and their lack of metrics to determine the effectiveness of their training.

Their philosophy is summed up on the first page of their training document. “Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they always have been by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth” (UK/BM-3 Translation).

With the stage set, the author of the training manual introduces issues that caused Al-Qaida to form. He states that Al-Qaida believe:

- 1) Unbelievers control Afghanistan.
- 2) The Muslim identity is being eradicated due to the presence of non-Islamic governments and Western ideology.
- 3) Members of the Islamic Movement are jailed and tortured for their beliefs.
- 4) Women are insulted by being stripped, having their heads shaved, and raped.

Accordingly, this is happening because the people have diverged from the course and law of Allah (UK/BM-5, 7 Translation).

In terms of a policy review, the first step is to *identify the problem*. According to Al-Qaida, three key problems exist:

- 1) Traditional Islamic religion is ignored.
- 2) There is no true Islamic “Government” in Afghanistan.
- 3) There are no true Islamic regimes in other countries.

The difficulty with the training manual and one of the reasons for the need of future research, is that the author does not define what he means when he discusses “Islamic religion” and “Islamic regimes or government.” In speaking with Muslims from the U.S. and Turkey, this author has discovered that Al-Qaida’s version of Islam diverges significantly. This fact in itself requires future study.

However, to continue with the policy review, step two is to discover if Al-Qaida have devised an *alternative* to the currently identified problems. The answer is yes. Al-Qaida’s alternative is to create new governments based on traditional Islamic ideals. This is because, as the training manual’s author quotes, Sheik Inb Taimia, “Governing the people’s affairs is one of the greatest religious obligations” (UK/BM-11 Translation). Al-Qaida have in fact decided to,

and are working on, the selected alternative of restoring traditional Islamic religion to all people. Current goals include creating a “true” [this author’s emphasis] Islamic government in Afghanistan and Islamic Regimes in other Countries (UK/BM-8, 12 Translation). They are not averse to using violence to achieve these ends. The manual does not distinguish between civilian or military, male or female targets. All are considered “unbelievers” and as such are potential targets. The second page of the training manual makes this quite clear. The author has written a five-point pledge for Al-Qaida members against their enemies.

- 1) Make their enemy’s women and children widows and orphans.
- 2) Make them want to die and dislike status symbols.
- 3) Slaughter them like lambs and let the rivers flow with their blood.
- 4) Destroy all unbelieving governments.
- 5) Retaliate against any insult, physical or verbal (UK/BM-5 Translation).

The interesting aspect of this pledge is that it is specifically written for women. This is curious since Al-Qaida are primarily a male organization and members who are married are prohibited from telling or involving their wives (UK/BM-55 Translation).

Step three is *implementation*. Al-Qaida are very precise when it comes to short- and long-term goals. According to the author, Al-Qaida’s short-term implementation includes information gathering, kidnapping, assassination, freeing captured members of the organization, propaganda, and the destruction of embassies, economic centers, bridges leading into and out of cities, and places of amusement or loose morality (not considered a vital target) (UK/BM-12 Translation). Long-term implementation includes the overthrow of all non-Islamic regimes and the replacement by Islamic regimes, “resisting ignorance” [this author believes this can be referred to as “Training”], “uniting ranks” [this author believes this can be referred to as “Recruitment”], and “adhering to Religion” [this author believes this can be referred to as “Retention”] (UK/BM-11, 13 Translation). Step four of a policy review is to distinguish different types of criteria in order to determine effectiveness. Based on this translation, we find that Al-Qaida are very sophisticated in both its recruiting and training. In order to become a member of Al-Qaida, a man must meet fourteen criteria. He must be a Muslim; committed to

the organization's ideology; mature; willing to sacrifice himself or members of his group for the organization; able to listen and obey; keep secrets and conceal information; be healthy; patient; calm; intelligent; insightful; cautious; honest; have the ability to observe, analyze, act, conceal oneself, and change positions as necessary for safety (UK/BM-15-19 Translation). Initial training includes seven criteria: how to forge documents, counterfeit currency, use appropriate communications and codes, transportation, weapons, poisons, and establish secure hideouts. This is followed by camp training which includes three criteria: physical fitness, how to shoot weapons, and tactics (UK/BM-5 Translation).

The author of the training manual did not discuss ways to determine the effectiveness of training, but did reference two instances where Al-Qaida members need to report back to the chain of command. The first was after a covert mission, and the second was after interrogation (UK/BM-73, 164). It is assumed that this information is used for lessons learned and re-evaluation of mission objectives and format. The manual does in fact analyze previous historical operations presenting a set of what can be construed as "lessons learned" to the reader (UK/BM-133-138). It is also possible that Al-Qaida use this information to evaluate the training and performance of its members, though the manual does not reference this. The conflict with using an evaluation system is mainly religious as Al-Qaida believe that everything that occurs is the will of Allah. According to their precepts, Al-Qaida can only strive to accomplish their goals and it really does not matter if they do not succeed (UK/BM-176-180 Translation).

The information gleaned in this analysis is similar to conclusions found in the four frameworks model, however, it presents the data in a different format. It specifically delineates Al-Qaida problems as they see them, demonstrates Al-Qaida's alternatives to fix these problems, strategies they have implemented to react to these problems including short- and long-term goals, criteria critical to the successful functioning of their organization, and a discussion on how Al-Qaida measures their success. This is significant as it specifically focuses on overall Al-Qaida strategy and policy.

H. CURRENT EVENTS

Once one understands the meaning behind a document, one must ascertain whether it is still relevant in current affairs. Accordingly, the following delineates events that occurred after September 11, 2001 and an analysis is conducted to determine if Al-Qaida actions are in line with their training manual precepts.

On October 9, 2001, the Associated Press reports that according to former Afghan fighters, thousands of Arab militants would, “fight to the death against a U.S.-led offensive,” (Associated Press, Oct 9, 2001, p 1). They are said to be the “military backbone...” of the Taliban and “...are not afraid to die. They want to die,” (Associated Press, Oct 9, 2001, p 1). Western Intelligence sources allegedly concur with this report. One 15-year-old Afghan states, “This is a test of our faith. I don’t care if I die. I will defend my country and my religion,” (Associated Press, Oct 9, 2001, p 2).

Also on October 9, 2001, the New York Times reported that the Al-Qaida network is global and affiliated with East Asian radical groups. They are currently “exchanging money, personnel, materiel, and experience with bin Laden and its allies,” (New York Times, Oct 9, 2001, p 1). Al-Qaida is specifically connected in the Philippines through its support of Islamic schools and charities (New York Times, Oct 9, 2001, p 1).

On October 10, 2001, Associated Press reporters Kathy Gannon and Amir Shah reported that Taliban loyalists were beating up Afghans working with UN-affiliated aid agencies and harassing and seizing UN vehicles in Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad, “apparently taking aim at one of the only Western symbols remaining in the country,” (Associated Press, Oct 10, 2001, p 1). This is an extension of Al-Qaida’s anti-Western policy.

On October 10, 2001, Salahuddin reported that the Taliban lifted restrictions against waging a holy war against the U.S.. Al-Qaida spokesman Sulaiman Bu Ghaith stated in a videotaped broadcast that his group would continue hijacking planes (Reuters, Kabul, Oct 10, 2001, p 1). The same day, Reuters reported that Osama bin Laden announced a day earlier that, “Jihad for God’s purposes is an obligation today for every Muslim on this earth,” (Reuters, Jakarta, Oct 10, 2001, p 1).

On October 19, 2001, Reuters reported that the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef stated that they would continue to protect Osama bin Laden, as it was a matter of faith (Reuters, Kabul, Oct 19, 2001, p 1).

On October 23, the Associated Press reported that an Al-Qaida cell operating out of Hamburg, Germany was responsible for the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center bombing. Part of the members' responsibilities were to exchange and deliver money and forge checks (Associated Press, Oct 23, 2001, p 1). This is in keeping with the objectives of the training manual.

On November 18, 2001, John Solomon of the Associated Press reported that U.S law enforcement officials said that terrorist supporters aligned with Al-Qaida and the Palestinian Hamas, falsified identity documents and visas and used stolen credit cards and wire transfers to finance their activities. They allege that this occurred in Boston, Texas, Northern California, Detroit, New Jersey, and suburban Washington. One law enforcement official stated, "We don't call each of them cells. We call them terrorist presences. They're almost like cliques. Clear in their hatred for America, and loosely working together," (Associated Press, Washington, Nov 18, 2001, p 1).

A report the same day by Ellen Knickmeyer stated that Taliban soldiers shot 100 of their comrades for trying to surrender. Surrender is not a part of the Al-Qaida creed. In Kunduz, a group of boys was killed for laughing at Taliban soldiers (Associated Press, Bangi, Nov 18, 2001, p 1-2). This follows the idea of never allowing oneself to be humiliated. A doctor was also shot because he failed to respond quickly enough to a call to treat Taliban soldiers (Associated Press, Bangi, Nov 18, 2001, p 1-2). This is an example of the precept of obeying immediately.

On November 20, 2001, the Taliban shot 470 of its own soldiers after learning they were planning to surrender. Alleged Taliban gunman attempted to kidnap a dozen international journalists enroute to Kabul (Associated Press, Nov 20, 2001, p 1-2). According to the training manual, members of Al-Qaida are trained for hostage taking.

On November 27, 2001, U.S. forces in Afghanistan discovered 40 laboratories containing a variety of chemical compositions (Associated Press, Nov 27, 2001, p 1). This follows the Al-Qaida training imperative of learning how to make poisons.

On November 28, 2001, hundreds of Al-Qaida and Taliban prisoners rioted inside a prison, seizing arms, and holding out for days before they were subdued or killed (Associated Press, Nov 28, 2001, p 1). This is another instance of the idea that one should never give up the cause.

On January 12, 2002, the Palm Beach Post printed an article by Elizabeth Neuffer delineating the year old discovery of Al-Qaida training tapes in Mir Bacha Kot, Afghanistan. This seven-hour tape showed Al-Qaida members receiving training on assassinations and hostage-taking tactics. Instruction was narrated in Arabic and geared to a non-Afghan audience. Narration comments included, “We are preparing ourselves for the way of God. We will get rid of those who are non-believers. You will have eternal life if you give your life in this way,” (Palm Beach Post, Jan 12, 2002). Analysts who have viewed the tapes indicate a high degree of understanding of Europe and the U.S. and preparation for attacks on the West. These tapes give a more detailed look at Al-Qaida life and training, and are critical for any future Al-Qaida research. The tapes reinforce the training manual in relation to training with explosives, sabotage, and significant religious motivation. A hand written note sums up Al-Qaida’s view of the infidel, “On the outside, they may be kind and give you food, but on the inside, they are still a non-believer,” (Palm Beach Post, Jan 12, 2002).

As of March 1, 2002, members of Al-Qaida and the Taliban are “regrouping in the mountains of eastern Paktia province in Pakistan, urging the faithful to wage holy war against U.S. forces,” (Associated Press, Mar 1, 2002, p 1). According to Ziarat Gul Mangal, deputy intelligence chief of Paktia province, Al-Qaida is telling the people that “once again Western countries are attacking Islam and Islam is at risk,” (Associated Press, Mar 1, 2002, p 1). Pamphlets are being distributed calling for holy war and Al-Qaida and the Taliban are receiving aid from Pakistani-based Islamic militants of Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, and Sipah-e-Sahaba (Associated Press, Mar 1, 2002, p 2).

Based on the above, this author hypothesizes that *the training manual and its precepts are still being used*. This is demonstrated through current events occurring in Afghanistan and the discovery of Al-Qaida training tapes.

I. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT

This analysis has revealed previously hidden themes and patterns. When one utilizes all four frames for analysis, one can gain a more comprehensive understanding of an organization because of the availability of more data. However, as with any analysis, the caution of the author of the training manual and his motives should be noted. Personal elements may exist in the text that are not representative of Al-Qaida and, therefore, may skew the whole analysis (Cordes, 1987, pp.30, 35-36). Chapter five summarizes the findings of this thesis, presents recommendations, answers primary and secondary research questions, and delineates areas of future research.

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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

What's past is prologue.

William Shakespeare (Bryson, 1995, p.188)

A. INTRODUCTION

Recently, a copy of an Al-Qaida training manual was acquired and translated. Specific training methodology is delineated. As this is new and unique data, research and analysis of this manual is critical to enhancing the intelligence community's knowledge and understanding of the Al-Qaida terrorist network.

Due to the events of September 11, 2001 and the U.S.'s recent attack of Afghanistan, specifically upon Al-Qaida training areas, research of terrorist organization and training methodologies and effectiveness is necessary. This study focused on Al-Qaida training techniques and methodologies and ascertained how they fit into the four frameworks model of structure, human resources, symbolism, and politics.

The objective was to determine how an Al-Qaida terrorist is trained and indoctrinated, ascertain the levels and value of the training, and determine the impact of a training site that is discovered or destroyed, as well as potentially predicting terrorist targets based on the specific type of training employed.

B. CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of the Al-Qaida training manual within the four frameworks model has reorganized information in new and different ways. Previously hidden themes and patterns have been revealed and conclusions are framed around the thirteen research questions. According to Bruce Hoffman, "Tactics and targets of various terrorist movements, as well as the weapons they favor, are therefore ineluctably shaped by a group's ideology, its internal organizational dynamics and the personalities of its key members, as well as a variety of internal and external stimuli" (Hoffman, 1998, p.157).

As noted in the training manual, Al-Qaida deny that they are terrorists. They feel their

cause is just based on religious decrees. The use of training manuals helps to portray the group in a favorable light, reinforces ideology, and illicit support. Al-Qaida have a strong need to rationalize and justify what they do. This author believes that the document was written during the Soviet Afghanistan War. It is one of many types of Al-Qaida training manuals. The manual is regional in scope and was written for new Al-Qaida recruits arriving at the guesthouse in Peshawar, Pakistan. The writer of the manual is well-educated and versed in history. The manual is sophisticated in its presentation of recruitment techniques, and it is believed that Al-Qaida based its methodology on CIA training documents specifically referring to espionage. Finally, changes in Al-Qaida organizational structure to cells or clusters have occurred since the writing of this manual and the manual's precepts are currently being used.

The following section delineates the thirteen research questions this thesis set out to answer based on information gleaned in the Al-Qaida training manual.

1) How can the four frameworks model enhance our understanding of the Al-Qaida network and its training process?

The four frameworks model gives analysts additional critical information about the Al-Qaida terrorist group in terms of structural, human resources, symbolic, and political perspective. It broadens the analysts' repertoire by enhancing understanding of Al-Qaida and allowing them to formulate alternative responses based on the presented data. Through reframing our knowledge of Al-Qaida, creative solutions to the war on terrorism and destruction of the Al-Qaida network can be discovered.

2) What is the structural framework of the Al-Qaida training process?

Al-Qaida are a very structurally rational group that emphasize formality and a specific chain of command coupled with allowances for creativity and semi-autonomy. The structure is flat, as a shift has occurred to a network style with cells and clusters with interaction between all members. Ideology and religion are the glue that hold the organization together and which are incorporated into Al-Qaida military procedures and training.

3) What training methods and processes are unique to Al-Qaida?

Al-Qaida utilize religious symbolism to justify their actions. Their rituals are presented in the form of training instructions. They are required by God to obey their leaders, become martyrs for the cause, or kill their own comrades if necessary. They can conduct any action if they believe it will advance their cause, including indiscriminant killing.

4) Can Al-Qaida's training be differentiated into specific categories?

Al-Qaida have both general and specialized training. This training manual delineates basic, generalized training for new members. Specific training includes special tactical operations and the recruitment of "secret agents." Specific training is posited to be delineated in alternate Al-Qaida training manuals.

5) What are the human resources implications of the Al-Qaida training process?

The human resources implications of the training process are: using the right person for the right job, discipline is critical, and members must be healthy, patient, adaptable, unflappable, and self-reliant. Al-Qaida are concerned for the training investment, their personnel, and the availability of mobility and variation in the organization through training opportunities. Al-Qaida do not incorporate their members into the big picture. A member is expected to work hard for the cause and distrust outsiders, including family and friends. Women are not part of Al-Qaida.

6) How does this training program take care of participant needs? Or does it?

Al-Qaida's training program meets the needs of its members through the use of religious, historical, and symbolic elements. Al-Qaida have a social responsibility to their members. Al-Qaida invest in people: they hire the right people and reward them, provide job security, promote from within, train and educate, and re-train existing cadres. Religious mandates exonerate Al-Qaida members from failure. Even though being a member of Al-Qaida is competitive and dangerous, members share common goals, mutual influence, and open

communication. Additionally, operational plans are tailored to an individual and members thoroughly learn their roles in the plan.

7) What reward systems exist?

Al-Qaida has a specific reward and punishment system in place; however, this manual does not delineate its contents. One does glean that Al-Qaida evaluates members to determine if they should remain in the group, advance, or be dismissed.

8) How do politics, coalition building, and conflict shape Al-Qaida's organization and training methodology?

Al-Qaida's political objective is to overthrow "godless regimes." Al-Qaida are determined to use violence rather than to negotiate. This shapes their organization and training methodology. The training manual is written for political reasons: the desire for a new government in Afghanistan. Al-Qaida maintain their power by not telling the members where their funds or weapons are stored. Bargaining and negotiation are critical skills. Members are required to have a pre-planned story to tell their captors. Al-Qaida believe they are acting rationally. Commanders and the upper echelons have positional power and control rewards. Information power is available to all members. The top levels of the organizational structure maintain coercive power, alliances and networks, access and control of agendas, and framing through the control of symbols and meaning. All members have personal power as they are sanctioned by God to do this type of work. The member is less powerful than the organization, so they pose a weak threat to the organization. Members support the organization, or do not continue to be a member.

9) Utilizing the symbolic frame, how do culture, kinship, religion, and social ties shape Al-Qaida's organization and training process?

Religious symbols are Al-Qaida's key motivational tool and used to justify Al-Qaida rhetoric. Al-Qaida are aware that life is uncertain; their knowledge comes from religion. The Al-Qaida culture states that violence will be part of their life and the group shares perceptions or

visions. Their culture places no blame on their members for failure. Al-Qaida dismisses members who cannot complete a mission or training, or have family problems. Symbolic words, calls to arms, and stories excite and motivate Al-Qaida members. Stories demonstrate the group need for certain attributes and relay an historical event, which focuses on the meaning, not what happened. Metaphors simplify concepts for Al-Qaida members and create a sense of emotionalism. Without symbolism, the structural and human resources elements would have no meaning for this group.

10) What are the implications of the destruction of Al-Qaida training camps?

The destruction of Al-Qaida training camps may have a negative psychological effect on Al-Qaida. However, due to their simplicity, they can easily be reconstituted in other locations. However, as Al-Qaida believe that everything that occurs is a result of the will of Allah, they must stoically accept this destruction and continue on their course to achieve their goals.

11) Is this an effective way to decrease Al-Qaida membership and ability to conduct terrorist attacks?

Yes, this is an effective way to decrease Al-Qaida membership because the local population may see that Al-Qaida is not “winning,” thus decreasing interest in joining. As far as hindering Al-Qaida’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks, it might have a short-term negative effect, but as the training camps are simple structures, in the long-term, they can easily be rebuilt elsewhere. Additionally, Al-Qaida is located in over 55 different countries. The U.S. has only targeted camps in Afghanistan. It is unknown to this author how many other camps exist in other locations.

12) What alternatives exist to decrease Al-Qaida membership?

This question cannot be answered based on information available in the training manual.

13) Based on Al-Qaida's organization and training methodology, can one predict future targets?

Yes, Al-Qaida has specifically delineated areas to attack, both in the short- and long-term. In their training manual, they state that primary targets are embassies, economic centers, and bridges leading into and out of cities. Places of amusement or loose morality are secondary targets.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

As demonstrated in this thesis, Al-Qaida's behavior is an odd combination paradox of the rational and the irrational. The first step is to determine whether members of Al-Qaida can perceive information in a rational manner. This process can be initiated with the detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Send a group of psychologists to Cuba to interview and analyze member philosophies and beliefs to determine if they are willing and able to accept new ideas. Assuming Al-Qaida members are indoctrinated in erroneous religious interpretations of the Koran, a targeted psychological campaign designed to reflect general Muslim virtues, should be the second step. This may determine the extent to which Al-Qaida members can be taught new ideas. The ultimate goal is to decrease resistance to the ideas of negotiation and political cooperation and demonstrate positive behavioral alternatives. If successful, the campaign can be refocused and expanded to Al-Qaida members around the world. Lessons learned from the "pilot" program in Cuba could be incorporated and area experts can devise specific plans for specific areas. While this is a labor-intensive recommendation, the ultimate benefit of saving military manpower and equipment would outweigh the cost.

Additionally, the U.S. could coordinate with Muslim religious leaders around the world, forming coalitions with the objective of a targeted proclamation of the Islamic irrationality of Al-Qaida's attacks and objectives and a "religious" call to have them return to their homes in peace. The goal is to re-assimilate the "outcasts" into the Islamic community in a peaceful, face-saving manner.

These recommendations will work only if members of Al-Qaida are willing and able to respond. If they are irrevocably tied to their ideology as is assumed, these measures will not likely work. However, two alternatives exist for dealing with Al-Qaida. The first is to “do nothing.” As is postulated in this thesis, as time progresses, new members of Al-Qaida will introduce different views to the group causing disruption and conflict. This may cause another shift within Al-Qaida to focus on political negotiation rather than indiscriminant killing. However, the counter argument to this is that Al-Qaida resources may increase over time as a result of faster, more secure communications, the greater availability of weapons, and the increased support of like-minded terrorist organizations and state sponsors.

A second alternative is to continue the prosecution of the campaign against Al-Qaida. This will wear their spirit down and may decrease their will to fight. However, traditionally speaking, when someone is forced on, as Sun Tzu says, “killing ground,” they are more apt to renew the fight and continue until their deaths. Additionally, as demonstrated in this thesis, Al-Qaida is ideologically against the idea of surrender. Their cause is sanctioned by God and must be prosecuted to the fullest extent. Al-Qaida has killed members of its own group for trying to surrender to coalition forces in Afghanistan.

However, the key to this problem is the Al-Qaida leadership. They are the driving force behind the reign of terror in which Al-Qaida is involved. “Taking them out” as the coalition forces and bombing campaigns in Afghanistan are designed to do, is the most effective method of stopping the group. However, in order to be effective, this must be coupled with a psychological effort of redirecting the feelings of hatred and hopelessness into something positive. These men must be given hope for the future.

To be truly effective, the international Islamic community must become involved. The focus should be repatriation efforts rather than the threat of beheading. Western countries need to take a step back from this involvement, as Al-Qaida’s main focus is anti-Western sentiment. A Western coalition presence in repatriation efforts will only exacerbate the situation, prolong the process, and increase the time it takes to heal the rift between their countries and the

members of Al-Qaida. This will be very difficult for the U.S. both politically and socially due to the September 2001 attack, however it is necessary and essential for the assimilation process.

This thesis only scratches the surface of analysis on the Al-Qaida terrorist group. As demonstrated, this training manual is old and elements of Al-Qaida structure, human resources, symbolism, and politics have changed. However, it is a good point of departure for further research. The following are areas that would enhance the intelligence communities' understanding of Al-Qaida.

D. SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Now that the U.S. has access to detained members of Al-Qaida, it would behoove the government to conduct interviews with Al-Qaida members about their realities and issues and determine how they are affected. The following are some specific areas for review:

- 1) Al-Qaida members live a life on the edge, without a home, family, or country. Determine the psychological toll on the members and the leadership.
- 2) Do Al-Qaida members feel they are living up to their full potential? Do they feel under or over utilized, or both?
- 3) Discover how the Al-Qaida member feels about excessive autonomy versus excessive interdependence, specifically how the member feels about "isolation."
- 4) Does an Al-Qaida member perceive non-support from the group?
- 5) Does a commander feel "frustration" at unnecessary coordination?
- 6) Are member roles too tightly linked or interdependent?
- 7) How is an Al-Qaida member taught to suspend his religious convictions during a mission?
- 8) Does Al-Qaida have a deeper, hidden goal not expressed in the training manual?
- 9) Is Al-Qaida an amoral structure that will do anything to remake the world in their image?
- 10) Discover the extent to which Al-Qaida have implemented the use of sophisticated Internet communications between cells. Is this part of a modernization effort, or a reaction to

the structural problem of looseness within the organization?

11) How does Al-Qaida central command respond to plans devised by their cells?

12) Are there members who even Al-Qaida leadership feels are too fanatical in their adherence to Al-Qaida policies?

13) How do Al-Qaida members live with the contradictions of their religion and actions?

14) Do they realize the existence of contradictions?

Alternative areas of research include:

1) Review the Koran passages cited in the Al-Qaida training manual to see if they are true to context or have been selectively taken out of context to fit the Al-Qaida ideals and objectives.

2) Utilize current Al-Qaida publications to determine Al-Qaida's rationality and political goals.

3) Study top-level decision making within the Al-Qaida organization with an emphasis on determining how and if Al-Qaida sets an agenda, maps the political terrain, networks and forms coalitions, and bargains and negotiates. This would be of significant help to the intelligence community.

4) Conduct a detailed review of chapter thirteen of the training manual codes and ciphers, comparing and contrasting them with intercepted Al-Qaida transmissions and communications to determine if they are still current and being used.

5) Conduct an Al-Qaida Stakeholder Analysis to ascertain who influences Al-Qaida and the extent of their power over them.

6) Conduct a Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, and Threat (SWOT) Analysis to reframe information about Al-Qaida on a more strategic level.

7) Conduct a more detailed Policy Review utilizing a larger variety of Al-Qaida documents.

8) Finally, conduct an organizational design review based on Henry Mintzberg's (as cited in Bolman and Deal, 1997, pp.33-36) and other organizational theories to more thoroughly define Al-Qaida's network structure.

E. POTENTIAL POLICY ISSUES

As demonstrated in this thesis, Al-Qaida is a powerful, goal-driven organization. The following are this author's ideas of potential ways to decrease their power. The first is to review Al-Qaida doctrine and religious decrees to determine weaknesses or non-conformity to the Islamic religion. Prepare psychological operations to pass the findings on to Al-Qaida members, supporters, and the population that harbors them. This would discredit Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaida leadership. Another idea is to increase Al-Qaida member frustration by preventing successful attacks, disrupting communications, and freezing assets and money transferring ability.

In order to truly understand Al-Qaida, human intelligence (HUMINT) sources need to infiltrate the group. HUMINT sources can also begin recruitment of Al-Qaida members as agents for the U.S. In order for the information gleaned by HUMINT sources to be analyzed and distributed quickly and efficiently, a unified intelligence organization should be established to coordinate intelligence efforts. Additionally, the U.S. intelligence community should increase monitoring of former Soviet block arsenals to prevent the export of weapons to Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. Targeting of Al-Qaida infrastructure, i.e., training camps and weapons storage areas should be continued. The military and the government should continue international pressure on States sponsoring terrorism, increase the public's understanding of the group and solicit their support for the continued actions against terrorists, and increase global support of the war on terrorism. While the above ideas will not destroy the Al-Qaida organization, they are practical applications that may assist policy makers in reducing the power of this group.

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